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ABSTRACT
Congress has a great affinity for debt adjustment bankruptcies. These are
bankruptcies in which a debtor keeps rather than liquidates her assets and
instead repays creditors out of future income. Chapter 13, which allows
individual consumer debtors to reorganize in this way, was supplemented in
1986 by chapter 12 for farm bankruptcies. In 2019, in the largest expansion of
debt adjustment bankruptcies since the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, Congress
made debt adjustment bankruptcy available to small businesses.
The reality is, however, that most debt adjustment bankruptcies fail. For that
reason, the relative rights of debtors and creditors when tensions arise are of
great importance. The bankruptcy court must know what protections a debtor
may resort to if she is struggling to make payments under her plan, and whether
new, unpaid creditors may undertake their own collection efforts if doing so will
jeopardize the bankruptcy case. Although these questions are basic, they are
unresolved. A deep split among bankruptcy courts and courts of appeals has
persisted in the law of chapter 13 since the early years of the Code. This disunity
threatens the bankruptcy courts’ ability to coherently implement Congress’s new
small business bankruptcy provisions. This Article proposes a solution to this
Gordian Knot, and then attempts to situate that solution within a broader
normative conception of debt adjustment bankruptcy law.
Doctrinally, the key division among courts concerns the lifespan of the
bankruptcy estate. Property within the estate is subject to court supervision and
protected by the automatic stay. This Article defends a theory of the bankruptcy
estate in debt adjustment bankruptcies known as the estate termination theory.
This theory holds that the bankruptcy estate is of a limited lifespan. Once the
debtor has secured court approval for a repayment plan and the case is
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underway, she is both free from bankruptcy court supervision and without
special bankruptcy court protection. Moreover, although a default rule, the
early termination of the bankruptcy estate is sticky. Preserving property within
the estate is possible, but the power to do so is limited. Some valid bankruptcy
law purpose is necessary before property can be retained within the estate.
On a broader level, this Article attempts to situate the limited lifespan of the
bankruptcy estate within a model of bankruptcy it dubs “light-touch”
bankruptcy. This model emphasizes the advantages of simple, streamlined, and
cheaply administrable procedures, and suggests that debtors may benefit most
by being able to enjoy a financial fresh start, free from entanglement with the
bankruptcy court, at the earliest possible moment during their bankruptcy cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Outside of the world of big business, debt adjustment plans are Congress’s
favored form of bankruptcy law.1 Congress has deployed both carrot and stick
to encourage individual debtors to seek relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code, preferring that debtors attempt to repay their debts over time rather than
liquidate their existing assets.2 As a result, hundreds of thousands of consumer
debtors file for chapter 13 each year. Owners of family farms and fisheries take
advantage of a similar invitation from Congress by seeking relief under chapter
12 of the Code. Congress has now taken its enthusiasm for debt adjustment plans
one step further. In 2019, Congress responded to complaints that the traditional
forms of business bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the Code are unworkable or
prohibitively expensive for owners of small businesses by passing the Small
Business Reorganization Act (“SBRA”).3 The SBRA makes debt adjustment
plans available to businesses with less than $2.7 million in debt,4 a category that
may comprise more than 40% of all business debtors.5
The SBRA went into effect in February 2020; bankruptcy courts, therefore,
are only just beginning to grapple with the applicable rules for such cases.6 In
all forms of debt adjustment bankruptcy, however, the basic mechanics of the
bankruptcy case are the same. Instead of liquidating their assets, debtors keep
all their pre-existing property and commit to paying their projected disposable
income to their pre-bankruptcy creditors during a repayment plan that typically
lasts from three to five years.7 After making those payments, and with certain
1
The Bankruptcy Code describes chapters 13 and 12 of the Code as regulating the “adjustment of debts”
of “an individual with regular income” and “a family farmer or fisherman with regular income” respectively. 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(18), (19A) (2019); Id. § 109(e). In this Article, I use the terms debt adjustment plan or debt
adjustment bankruptcy to refer to a bankruptcy case filed under these chapters or under new subchapter V of
chapter 11, each of which shares the same structure.
2
Sara Sternberg Greene, Parina Patel & Katherine Porter, Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2017); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 5, as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5966 (“In the consumer area, proposed chapter 13 encourages more
debtors to repay their debts over an extended period rather than to opt for straight bankruptcy liquidation and
discharge”); see H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 12–13 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 99.
3
Small Business Reorganization Act (SBRA) of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079 (2019),
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1181–1195).
4
Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2019) (defining “small business debtor”).
5
Professor Robert Lawless estimates that approximately 40% of business debtors filing for bankruptcy
under current law would qualify for relief under the SBRA. Robert Lawless, How Many New Small Business
Chapter 11s, CREDIT SLIPS (Sept. 14, 2019), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/09/how-many-newsmall-business-chapter-11s.html. In 2019, 5,814 business bankruptcy cases were filed under traditional chapter
11, Table F-2, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/bf_f2_1231.2019.pdf (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019).
6
SBRA § 5, 133 Stat. 1087.
7
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2019) (defining projected disposable income as the debtor’s projected gross

SEYMOUR_11.30.20

4

1/4/2021 3:32 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

exceptions, the debtor’s remaining liabilities that pre-date the bankruptcy case
are discharged.8 The statutory language in large part tracks from chapter to
chapter of the Code. The pre-existing law of chapters 13 and 12, therefore,
should tell us much about how small business reorganizations are to be
administered.
Even if simple in concept, the law of debt adjustment plans is far from
settled.9 When all does not go according to plan, the hierarchy of rights among
the bankruptcy case’s stakeholders is unclear. That lack of clarity is particularly
important given debtors’ low rate of success in completing reorganization
plans.10 Individual debtors in as many as two-thirds of all chapter 13 cases fail
to make all payments required by their plans and are forced either to dismiss
their cases or convert to another form of bankruptcy relief (most likely simple
liquidation under chapter 7 of the Code).11 Similarly, about 60% of chapter 12
reorganizations do not result in a completed plan.12 There are thousands of new
small business cases expected each year. Once tensions arise in these cases, just
as in the failed chapter 12 and 13 cases, the bankruptcy court must determine
whose rights take precedence among three groups of parties to the case: the
debtor herself; the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy (or prepetition) creditors; and the
debtor’s new, postpetition creditors to whom she has incurred debts only after
filing the bankruptcy case. Yet, the law on which bankruptcy courts must base
these determinations is subject to bitter dispute.
Consider a debtor who has begun a debt adjustment bankruptcy and some
months later wants to buy a truck. This may be a consumer debtor who wants to
buy a truck for personal use or to drive to and from work, or a small business
debtor who wants to use the truck in its business. In either case, the debtor
expects to use some of her pre-bankruptcy savings to make the down payment
for the truck and, thereafter, to use a portion of her income earned during the
bankruptcy case to make monthly payments, while continuing to make her
ongoing payments to prepetition creditors. May the debtor make these
expenditures, or does the use of either pre-existing savings or current monthly
income require the bankruptcy court’s permission? And if the debtor’s
income less projected necessary or permitted expenses).
8
Id. § 1328
9
See David Gray Carlson, The Chapter 13 Estate and Its Discontents, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
233, 233 (2009) (“Thirty years into the life of the Bankruptcy Code, the courts still have no coherent theory of
chapter 13.”).
10
Greene, Patel & Porter, supra note 2, at 1032.
11
Greene, Patel & Porter, supra note 2, at 1032.
12
See Jamey Mavis Lowdermilk, A Fighting Chance? Small Family Farmers and How Little We Know,
86 TENN. L. REV. 177, 192 (2018).
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prepetition creditors believe the deal is a bad one, may they object and be heard
in the bankruptcy court?
Next, assume that the debtor has purchased the truck, but has fallen behind
on his payments. May the auto lender repossess the truck from the debtor (as it
would do if no bankruptcy case existed), or must the lender also obtain
permission from the bankruptcy court? And does it matter whether taking the
truck would interfere with the debtor’s ability to make her continuing payments
to prepetition creditors or to provide for her own needs?
The unanswered question is this: when a debtor has already finalized the
details of her repayment plan and begins making payments to creditors, is the
debtor fully in control of all of her other assets—meaning she is able to
immediately enjoy the benefits and responsibilities of the fresh start—or does
her property remain subject to bankruptcy court supervision and protection
while she is making payments in accordance with her plan?
Although unresolved, this issue is fundamental to bankruptcy practice.
District-by-district, debtors and creditors’ rights are significantly altered as
individual bankruptcy courts give effect to their own interpretations of the Code.
In some districts, a debtor seeking to use her assets outside the ordinary course
may be denied permission because of the potential impact that decision will have
on future payments to prepetition creditors under the plan.13 This approach
ascribes paramount importance to protecting the debtor’s financial health so that
she is able to continue making payments under the plan to prepetition creditors
and may shield the debtor’s property from collection efforts by new postpetition
creditors. Other courts take the opposite view, relying on the law of traditional
business reorganizations under chapter 11. Debt adjustment plans are similar to
reorganization proceedings in both governing statutory text and structure. In
consequence, in a debt adjustment plan proceeding––as in a traditional chapter
11 reorganization––these bankruptcy courts hold that a debtor who has
embarked upon a repayment plan is financially independent; she is able to deal
with her assets as she chooses, but equally unable to look to the bankruptcy court
for protection should some new creditor look to those assets for satisfaction.
The outcome that is chosen depends on the bankruptcy court’s theory of the
bankruptcy estate. When a case is filed, the Code provides that all of the debtor’s
property is subsumed into the bankruptcy estate—a fictitious legal entity that
holds the debtor’s property and places it under the bankruptcy court’s

13

See, e.g., In re Ward, 546 B.R. 667, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016).
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authority.14 But there is no consensus as to when that property leaves the estate.
Four theories have been advanced, each reflecting substantially different
understandings of how debt adjustment bankruptcy operates. This four-way
circuit split has persisted for most of the Code’s history.15 The competing
theories have primarily been developed in cases addressing debt adjustment
plans of individuals under chapter 13, but the courts have found equal
application in cases under chapter 12. Now that the bankruptcy courts will face
these same questions once again when dealing with the restructuring of small
businesses under the SBRA, this long-time legal puzzle should be resolved.
This Article attempts that task. It defends a simple view of the bankruptcy
estate in debt adjustment cases known as the estate termination theory. Despite
its simplicity, this theory is rarely adopted by courts. The estate termination
theory holds that the bankruptcy estate is of limited lifespan. None of the
debtor’s property remains in the bankruptcy estate after the debtor’s plan is
confirmed. At least by default, the debtor’s assets are both liberated and
unprotected. Addressing an issue that has received less attention, this Article
further argues that the estate termination theory is a sticky default rule.
Otherwise stated, property may be retained in the bankruptcy estate postconfirmation only when the debtor has made a showing that this property is
necessary to the fulfilment of the debt adjustment plan. This rule has been
adopted by even fewer courts than have endorsed the basic estate termination
theory, but this Article traces the rule’s origins to brief and cryptic dicta in a
Seventh Circuit decision from over twenty years ago.16 Recently, the Seventh
Circuit reiterated this conclusion in a trio of short decisions that, while forceful
in their conclusions, are not especially illuminating in their reasoning.17 This
Article supplies the doctrinal underpinnings to support the court’s conclusion.
Finally, this Article describes how limiting the lifespan of the estate in debt
adjustment bankruptcies may be one way of implementing a model of “lighttouch” bankruptcy. Under this model, Congress and bankruptcy courts should
favor rules for debt adjustment bankruptcies that render them cheaper and
simpler to administer. The broad intention is to minimize both the shadow of the

14

11 U.S.C. § 541 (2019).
See Carlson, supra note 9, at 233.
16
See generally In re Heath, 115 F.3d 521, 522–23 (7th Cir. 1997) (Judge Posner suggesting that “[i]t
would presumably be an abuse of discretion for the bankruptcy judge to confirm a plan that retained more of the
property in the hands of the trustee than was reasonably necessary to fulfill the plan, though we need not decide
that in this case..”).
17
See In re Steenes, 918 F.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Steenes I]; In re Steenes, 942 F.3d
834, 839 (7th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Steenes II]; In re Cherry, 963 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2020).
15
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bankruptcy proceeding over the debtor and the debtor’s need to interact with the
bankruptcy court during the bulk of the plan period. In addition to the potential
for positive effects on access to bankruptcy, structuring debt adjustment
bankruptcy along these lines reflects the reality that most debtors do not seek
bankruptcy protection because of financial mismanagement or for strategic
reasons. Those debtors should be able to realize the benefits of a financial fresh
start and the resulting independence as quickly and completely as possible.
Part I of this Article sets forth the relevant statutory background. It gives
most attention to chapter 13 of the Code because the vast majority of the cases
discussing this issue have arisen under that chapter. It then explains that other
debt adjustment bankruptcies arising under chapter 12 and the new small
business bankruptcy provisions contain materially identical features. Part II
discusses the four theories of the bankruptcy estate and explains that the estate
termination theory both best reflects Congress’s intent and best implements the
policy goals of debt adjustment bankruptcy. Part III then explains why the
default rule embodied in the estate termination theory is a sticky default rule.
Part IV explains how early termination of the estate fits in with a broader theory
of “light-touch” bankruptcy for consumers and small businesses.
I.

THE DEBT ADJUSTMENT BANKRUPTCY BARGAIN

Congress has steadily expanded the availability of debt adjustment
bankruptcies. Since February 2020, bankruptcy law has offered debt adjustment
to three distinct categories of debtors. The oldest and by far the most widespread
form of debt adjustment bankruptcy is chapter 13. Chapter 13 dates back to the
enactment of the Code in 1978. It is available to individuals who earn regular
income and have a total of less than approximately $1.7 million in secured and
unsecured debt.18 An individual whose debts arise from running an
unincorporated business may file for chapter 13; the vast majority of chapter 13
cases, however, involve individual consumer debtors.
Congress next added chapter 12 to the Code. Chapter 12 has been available
to family farmers and fishermen since 1986.19 Chapter 12 cases, therefore,
concern small businesses, albeit businesses of a specialized kind; the debtor
may, as a technical matter, be either the business owner or the corporation or

18
The debt limits are $419,275 in noncontingent, liquidated unsecured debt and $1,257,850 in
noncontingent liquidated secured debt. 11 U.S.C § 109(e) (2019). The debt limits are updated triennially. Id.
§ 104(a).
19
Id. § 109(f).
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partnership owned by the family farmer or fisherman.20 Since February 2020,
chapter 12 has been available to family farms with up to $10 million in debt.21
Again, the chapter 12 debtor must earn regular income.22
The newest form of debt adjustment bankruptcy is for small business
debtors. The Code defines a small business as a business with less than $2.7
million in noncontingent and liquidated debt.23 Those businesses may take
advantage of a new subchapter V added to chapter 11 of the Code.24 Prior to
February 2020, chapter 11 contained some special provisions applicable to small
businesses, but those provisions did not disturb the central mechanics of
traditional chapter 11, including most importantly, the absolute priority rule, or
the rule that the business owner could not keep any value in the bankruptcy case
until all of her creditors are paid in full.25 Subchapter V now makes available a
form of bankruptcy for such businesses modeled on chapter 12 of the Code—
and by extension chapter 13—although one that includes a number of variations
from its two progenitors.26
At heart, all three forms of debt adjustment bankruptcy share the same
structure. That structure reflects a basic bargain between a debtor and her
creditors. The debtor may retain both ownership and possession of all her
property. That distinguishes debt adjustment bankruptcy from other forms of
bankruptcy. In contrast, in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case non-exempt property is
liquidated for the benefit of the debtor’s creditors by a chapter 7 trustee, while
in a traditional chapter 11 case, the value of shareholders’ ownership rights in a
reorganizing business may be used to repay the business’s creditors.27 In debt
adjustment bankruptcy, in exchange for being able to keep her prepetition
property, the debtor agrees to commit her projected disposable income pursuant
to a court-approved plan over an up-to-five-year period towards paying back
prepetition creditors.28 Creditors recover more by virtue of these payments than

20

Id. §§ 101(18), (19A).
Id. § 101(18). The debt limits for family fishermen are smaller. Id. § 101(19A).
22
Id. § 109(f).
23
Id. § 101(51D). This limit has been temporarily raised to $7.5 million by the CARES Act. Id. § 1182.
24
See supra text accompanying note 3.
25
See 11 U.S.C. § 1116.
26
See Paul W. Bonapfel, A Guide to the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J.
571, 575 (2019).
27
11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (“Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the debtor
shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.”); see also id. §§ 1207(b), 1185(b) (same); but see id.
§ 704(a)(1) (“The trustee shall—collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for which such trustee
serves . . . .”).
28
Id. § 1322(a)(4); see, e.g., Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 508 (2010).
21
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if the debtor’s property were liquidated.29 If the debtor successfully completes
all plan payments, she receives a discharge of most categories of debt provided
for under the plan and thus exits bankruptcy keeping all of her property.30
A. Debt Adjustment Under Chapter 13
This section will explain the three core components of any debt adjustment
bankruptcy—the bankruptcy estate, the automatic stay, and the plan of
reorganization. The section begins with chapter 13 of the Code. Chapter 13 is
the oldest of the three forms of debt adjustment bankruptcy and is
overwhelmingly the most commonly resorted to by debtors.31 Hundreds of
thousands of debtors file chapter 13 petitions each year; at most a few hundred
family farmers reorganize annually under chapter 12.32 For that reason, the vast
majority of decisions analyzing the lifespan of the bankruptcy estate arise out of
chapter 13 cases. After discussing the estate, stay, and plan in the context of
chapter 13, this section will show that each of these features is replicated in both
chapter 12 of the Code and subchapter V of chapter 11.
1. The Chapter 13 Estate and the Automatic Stay
One essential feature of chapter 13 cases is the estate. The filing of a
bankruptcy petition, whether under chapter 7 or chapter 13 of the Code, creates
a bankruptcy estate.33 The estate is a fictitious legal entity that takes title to the
debtor’s property and subjects it to bankruptcy court jurisdiction, supervision,
and protection. In a chapter 7 case, the estate is composed of “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.”34 Those are the assets that the chapter 7 trustee may marshal and distribute
to the debtor’s prepetition creditors. In a chapter 7 case, therefore, the debtor
turns over all of his property, except for property protected by a federal or state
law exemption,35 to the trustee at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.36 In a
chapter 13 case, the estate comprises not only property the debtor owns “as of

29

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(4), 1225(a)(4), 1191(a)–(b).
Id. §§ 1328, 1228, 1192.
31
Greene, Patel & Porter, supra note 2, at 1032.
32
Id.; Lowdermilk, supra note 12, at 179–80 n. 6 (collecting data).
33
11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 1306.
34
Id. § 541(a)(1).
35
Id. § 522(b)(1) (providing that “[n]otwithstanding section 541,” an individual debtor may exempt
certain property from the bankruptcy estate); see also id. § 522(d) (listing federal exemptions); id. § 522(b)(3)
(incorporating state law exemptions).
36
Id. § 704(a)(1).
30
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the commencement of the case,”37 but also “all property . . . that the debtor
acquires . . . before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted . . . whichever
occurs first,”38 and “earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case, but before the case is closed, dismissed, or
converted.”39 Unlike in chapter 7, however, the chapter 13 debtor remains in
possession of all property of the estate,40 and has limited rights to use and deal
with that property.41
At the same time as the bankruptcy petition is filed and the estate is created,
the automatic stay goes into effect.42 The automatic stay “gives the debtor a
breathing spell” from the collection efforts of prepetition creditors.43 To serve
that goal, the automatic stay prohibits, inter alia: “the commencement or
continuation” of any “action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could
have been commenced before the commencement of the case . . . or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case;”44 the
enforcement of a judgment obtained prepetition;45 any act to create, perfect, or
enforce a lien securing a prepetition claim;46 and “any act to collect, assess, or
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case.”47
The automatic stay plays a second critical role, preserving the bankruptcy
estate so that assets remain available to be distributed to creditors or otherwise
to be disposed of in accordance with bankruptcy principles.48 The key provision
through which this goal is implemented is section 362(a)(3) of the Code. That
subsection prohibits “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate … or
to exercise control over property of the estate;”49 a companion subsection
prohibits acts to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the estate.50
The most important effect of these subsections is to extend the automatic stay to

37

Id. § 541(a)(1).
Id. § 1306(a)(1).
39
Id. § 1306(a)(2).
40
Id. § 1306(b).
41
See In re Seely, 492 B.R. 284, 290 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013); In re Pisculli, 426 B.R. 52, 65–66
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1303.02 (16th ed. 2020).
42
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
43
See Kimbrell v. Brown, 651 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir. 2011).
44
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
45
Id. § 362(a)(2).
46
Id. § 362(a)(5).
47
Id. § 362(a)(6).
48
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03 (16th ed. 2020).
49
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
50
Id. § 362(a)(4).
38
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a debtor’s postpetition creditors. Prepetition creditors are already barred by the
remaining provisions of section 362(a) from taking steps to collect on their
claims. The stay of acts against the estate is treated somewhat differently by the
Code than the remaining provisions of the automatic stay.51 The Code provides
that the stay, as created by these provisions, “continues until such property is no
longer property of the estate. . . .”52 The stay against other types of collection
efforts continues until the case is closed or dismissed, or until the individual
debtor receives a discharge.53 A creditor may obtain relief from the automatic
stay from the bankruptcy court for cause.54 Nonetheless, the stay gives effect to
a weighty bias in favor of preserving the status quo during bankruptcy cases,
preventing creditors from disturbing that status quo without, at a minimum,
subjecting their case for so doing to bankruptcy court scrutiny.55
Indeed, the protections of the automatic stay are remarkably comprehensive.
They upend the way in which creditors deal with debtors. A landlord may be
prohibited from taking steps to dispossess any tenant with an interest in the
property they occupy—potentially even a tenant at sufferance or other occupant
who, absent bankruptcy, could be evicted post-haste.56 A municipal government
whose ordinary practice is to impound the vehicles of residents who are
delinquent on parking tickets will face sanctions if it knowingly boots the car of
a chapter 13 debtor while the vehicle remains property of the estate.57 The
automatic stay is thus of enormous importance to prospective debtors. Because
section 362(a)(3) of the Code ties the scope of the stay’s protections, in part, to
the extent of the bankruptcy estate, the reach of the chapter 13 estate itself is a
question of great practical importance for chapter 13 debtors and their creditors.
Just as the Code protects the debtor by subjecting property subsumed into
the bankruptcy estate to the automatic stay, it also constrains the debtor. Property
of the estate is subject to the supervision of the bankruptcy court. The court must
grant leave for any use or sale of estate property outside the ordinary course of
business.58 Section 1303 of the Code provides that, in chapter 13, the right to
seek permission for such a use or sale of estate property belongs exclusively to
51

See id. § 362(c)(1).
Id.
53
Id. § 362(c)(2).
54
Id. § 362(d)(1).
55
See In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 126 (3d Cir. 2019).
56
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03[5] n. 46 and accompanying text (16th ed. 2020) (citing
Convenient Food Mart v. Convenient Indus. Of Am., Inc., 968 F.2d 592, 594 (6th Cir. 1992); In re 48th Street
Steakhouse, Inc., 835 F.2d 427, 430–31 (2d Cir. 1987)).
57
See In re Fisher, 198 B.R. 721, 722–23 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
58
11 U.S.C. § 363; see id. § 1303.
52
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the debtor and not to the chapter 13 trustee.59 Nothing in chapter 13 explicitly
authorizes most debtors to use property of the estate in the ordinary course to
pay routine expenses,60 but courts assume the debtor has that power.61 At the
beginning of the bankruptcy case all of the debtor’s property is stripped from
him and absorbed into the bankruptcy estate. Without the power to make
ordinary course dispositions from the bankruptcy estate, the debtor would have
no power to buy groceries, make rent, or pay other household expenses.
Nonetheless, bankruptcy courts guard property of the estate, and may impose
sanctions on debtors who too freely dispose of estate assets.62
The chapter 13 estate is vital in one more respect: the boundaries of the estate
play a key role in determining the extent of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
Bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over proceedings “arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.”63 The first two bases for jurisdiction
involve different types of proceedings with some special relationship to
bankruptcy.64 The third, and broadest, basis for bankruptcy jurisdiction is
“related to” jurisdiction. “An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could
alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either
positively or negatively)[,] and which in any way impacts upon the handling and
administration of the bankrupt estate.”65 Whether an asset remains within the
bankruptcy estate therefore largely determines whether the bankruptcy court
may exercise jurisdiction over disputes regarding that asset.66 Finally, while
59

Id. § 1303.
For business debtors in both chapter 11 and chapter 13, section 363(c) of the Code authorizes the trustee
or debtor in possession to enter into transactions and use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business
without court permission. Section 1304 grants the section 363(c) power to a chapter 13 debtor “engaged in
business.” Id. § 1304(b). There is thus a plausible negative inference that a non-commercial debtor does not have
such powers—or at least, that the chapter 13 debtor cannot exercise them exclusively, independent of the trustee.
There is no equivalent in chapter 13 of section 1107 of the Code, which provides a blanket authorization to the
chapter 11 debtor to operate its business. Id. § 1107(a).
61
E.g., In re Seely, 492 B.R. 284, 290 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013); In re Pisculli, 426 B.R. 52, 66 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (debtor may use estate property for “ordinary and necessary living expenses, provided such use is not in
bad faith”); see 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1303.02 (16th ed. 2020).
62
See, e.g., In re Pisculli, 426 B.R. at 59–66; In re Fatsis, 405 B.R. 1, 10–11 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009).
63
28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b); see id. § 157.
64
So-called “arising under” jurisdiction extends to rights created by the Code itself. See CoreStates Bank,
N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 195 n.6, 196 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d 1279,
1285 (9th Cir. 2013). “Arising in” jurisdiction extends to proceedings that “would have no existence outside of
a bankruptcy case.” In re Wilshire, 729 F.3d at 1285; see In re Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 267
(3d Cir. 1991).
65
Pacor Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
66
See In re Fietz, 852 F.2d 455, 456–59 (9th Cir. 1988). In Fietz, Dale and Gloria, a former husband and
wife held claims against the same defendant. Id. at 456. Gloria claimed that California’s community property
doctrine meant that both were swept into the estate created when Dale filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case. Id. at
458. Gloria sought to assert her claim as a crossclaim in litigation before the bankruptcy court. Id. at 456. The
60
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bankruptcy courts frequently exercise concurrent jurisdiction with other courts,
the Judiciary Code provides that the bankruptcy forum has exclusive jurisdiction
over property of the estate.67
2. The Chapter 13 Plan
The most significant feature of every chapter 13 case is the plan. Promptly
after the initiation of a chapter 13 bankruptcy case, the debtor is required to file
a plan.68 Generally, a debtor is required to commit all of her projected disposable
income to funding the plan, typically for a period of three to five years.69 The
plan must pay creditors at least as much as they would have received in a
liquidation.70 Where form chapter 13 plans are available, the plan proposed by
the debtor must use the prescribed form.71 The bankruptcy court will confirm
the plan if it meets all of the requirements set forth in the Code.72 The chapter
13 trustee distributes all funds received from the debtor to the creditors
according to the terms of the confirmed plan.73 Absent special circumstances,
and excluding administrative expenses (which, in a chapter 13 case, typically
comprise the debtor’s attorneys’ fees) only prepetition debts are included within
a chapter 13 plan.74 Postpetition creditors do not, therefore, as a general matter,
receive distributions from the chapter 13 trustee.75

Ninth Circuit found, however, that Gloria’s claim had passed out of the bankruptcy estate in Dale’s chapter 13
bankruptcy case upon confirmation of the plan. Id. at 458. For that reason, although the bankruptcy court could
decide Dale’s claim, it was unable to exercise jurisdiction over Gloria’s claim, and was required—
notwithstanding Gloria’s apparent preference for resolution of her claim in the bankruptcy court alongside
Dale’s—to grant a motion to dismiss that claim. Id. at 458–59.
67
28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(e)(1)–(2).
68
11 U.S.C. § 1321 (2019); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b) (“If a plan is not filed with the petition, it shall
be filed within 14 days thereafter.”).
69
11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(1), 1325(b)(1)(B).
70
Id. § 1325(a)(4).
71
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(c), 3015.1.
72
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1).
73
Id. § 1326(c).
74
Id. § 1322(a)(4) (plan may provide for payments of unsecured claims); id. § 501(a) (creditor may file
proof of claim); id. § 101(10)(A) (“creditor” means entity that has a claim against the debtor arising at the time
of or before filing of the bankruptcy case); but see id. § 1305 (limited circumstances under which postpetition
creditors may file proof of claim); id. § 1322(a)(6) (plan may provide for payments of proofs of claim filed
pursuant to § 1305). Some chapter 13 plans also provide for “conduit payment” of the debtor’s ongoing monthly
mortgage payments by chapter 13 trustee. AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ABI COMMISSION ON
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 184–88 (2019).
75
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania described why that must be the case:
Prepetition creditors are bound by the provisions of a confirmed plan whether or not the claim of
such creditor is provided by the plan and whether or not such creditor has objected to, accepted
or rejected the plan . . . . In sharp contrast, postpetition creditors cannot be forced to participate
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Confirmation of a chapter 13 plan decisively reorders the debtor’s legal
relationships. The debtor and every creditor are bound by the terms of the
confirmed plan.76 In effect, the plan is a contract between the debtor and his
prepetition creditors.77 The plan is also a final judgment of the bankruptcy
court.78 The res judicata effect of a confirmed plan ensures that the “balance of
interests” struck at confirmation persists thereafter.79
In addition to the relationships between debtor and creditors, the plan
impacts the chapter 13 estate. Section 1327(b) of the Code provides that
“[e]xcept as provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the
confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor.”80 A
companion provision, section 1322(b)(9), instructs that the chapter 13 plan
proposed by the debtor shall “provide for the vesting of property of the estate,
on confirmation of the plan or at a later time, in the debtor or in any other
entity.”81 The precise meaning of those provisions, as the next section will
discuss, has perplexed the courts for many years. The best and simplest
explanation is that the Code contemplates that the debtor will regain title to all
of her property from the bankruptcy estate after confirmation—of course, the
debtor is still required to make plan payments out of future income to the trustee
to satisfy creditors’ claims.
Following confirmation, the plan may be modified at the request of the
debtor, the trustee, or an unsecured creditor because plan payments are
calculated based on a debtor’s projected disposable income and changed
circumstances may necessitate an adjustment of payment amounts.82 If the
debtor completes the plan, she receives a discharge.83

in a Chapter 13 plan, although they may elect to do so voluntarily [under section 1305].
In re Weisel, 400 B.R. 457, 472 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009).
76
Id. § 1327(a).
77
See In re Murphy, 474 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A confirmed Chapter 13 plan is ‘a new and
binding contract, sanctioned by the court, between the debtors and their pre-confirmation creditor[s].’”) (quoting
In re Penrod, 169 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1994)); In re Harvey, 213 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2000); In
re Oparaji, 698 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2012) (a chapter 13 plan is an “exchanged for bargain between the debtor
and the debtor’s creditors”); In re Forte, 341 B.R. 859, 869–70 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (discussing “contract
between a debtor and creditors formed by confirmation of the chapter 13 plan.”).
78
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 269 (2010).
79
In re Harvey, 213 F.3d at 321.
80
11 U.S.C. § 1327(b).
81
Id. § 1322(b)(9).
82
Id. § 1325(b).
83
Id. § 1328.
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Chapter 13 provides meaningful benefits to debtors by providing
opportunities for them to keep their houses, cars, or other valuable prepetition
assets that might be subject to liquidation in a chapter 7 case.84 The Supreme
Court has explained this basic bargain:
Proceedings under Chapter 13 can benefit debtors and creditors alike.
Debtors are allowed to retain their assets, commonly their home or car.
And creditors, entitled to a Chapter 13 debtor’s “disposable”
postpetition income, § 1325(b)(1), usually collect more under a
Chapter 13 plan than they would have received under a Chapter 7
liquidation.85

But chapter 13 remains entirely voluntary.86 A chapter 13 debtor possesses a
non-waivable right to convert a bankruptcy case to chapter 7 at any time
(assuming eligibility to be a chapter 7 debtor)87 or to dismiss the bankruptcy case
outright.88 Other parties in interest may also move for conversion or dismissal
of the bankruptcy case for cause, including the chapter 13 trustee, if the debtor
defaults on her obligations under the plan.89
B. The Debt Adjustment Bargain for Businesses
Chapter 12 and subchapter V both share key features of chapter 13. The
bankruptcy estate subsumes all the debtor’s property, both prepetition and
postpetition.90 The same provisions of the automatic stay apply to provide the
debtor personally with comprehensive protection against any attempt to collect
a prepetition debt. But this only protects property of the estate, and not the debtor
herself, from interference by postpetition creditors or others.
Similarly, the decisive legal moment in both a chapter 12 case and a small
business subchapter V case is the confirmation of the plan. The plan binds all
parties to the case.91 As in chapter 13, confirmation of the plan vests all property
of the estate in the debtor.92 The plan, and indeed the plan confirmation process,
may look somewhat different from chapter to chapter. Chapter 13 cases involve
off-the-shelf plans presented to the bankruptcy court on pre-approved forms, and
84

See Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015).
Id.
86
See id.
87
11 U.S.C. § 1307(a), (g).
88
Id. § 1307(b).
89
Id. § 1307(c).
90
Id. §§ 1207(a), 1186(a). Section 1186 differs from sections 1306(a) and 1207 in one key respect,
detailed later in this Article. See infra Part II.B.
91
11 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
92
Id. §§ 1227(b), 1141(d).
85
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it appears that plans under subchapter V will follow this pattern,93 while a
chapter 12 plan may be individually drafted and include more bespoke
provisions. Chapter 13 and 12 plans are always subject to streamlined
procedures; creditors do not vote on confirmation of the plan, but merely have
the right to object if they believe some provision of the plan to be unlawful or
that the plan as a whole is not feasible.94 Subchapter V contemplates that
creditors will vote on plans, but provides that a plan may be confirmed without
creditor approval if it meets the statutory requirements.95
In structure, however, plans remain––in respects material to this analysis––
the same under all three types of debt adjustment bankruptcy. The chapter 12
and subchapter V debtor, like the chapter 13 debtor, commit their projected
disposable income to the repayment of creditors. Because the debtor in these
cases is a business, projected disposable income is defined as any income “not
reasonably necessary to be expended . . . for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation, or operation of the business of the
debtor.”96 The plan may last no longer than five years, but must pay creditors at
least as much as they would have received in a liquidation of the debtor’s
prepetition property.97 Just as in chapter 13, from the beginning of the case, the
debtor remains in possession of estate property and, at least initially, must secure
court permission to deal with that property outside of the ordinary course of
business.98 As in chapter 13, it is unresolved whether this court oversight
continues after the debtor’s plan is confirmed and payments are in progress, or
whether instead the debtor has the right to deal with that property freely.
II. THE LIFESPAN OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
In each of these variants of the debt adjustment bankruptcy model, courts
must determine the fate of the bankruptcy estate upon confirmation of a plan.
Current law is fractured. That is the case even though no such dispute exists in
other types of bankruptcy cases. This Section will explain the dispute over the
lifespan of the bankruptcy estate in debt adjustment cases. Once again, it will
begin with chapter 13 of the Code, before returning to look at the same dispute

93
A standard form plan has been approved for use in subchapter V cases. U.S. COURTS, B 425A, PLAN
REORGANIZATION FOR SMALL BUSINESSES UNDER CHAPTER 11 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/
small-business-forms/plan-reorganization-small-business-under-chapter-11.
94
11 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1225.
95
See id. § 1191.
96
Id. § 1191(d); see id. § 1225(b)(2)(B) (same).
97
Id. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1191, 1222, 1225.
98
Id. §§ 1186(b), 1207(b); see id. 363(b).
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in the context of chapter 12 and subchapter V of chapter 11. At its root, the
question of the lifespan of the bankruptcy estate is one of statutory interpretation,
and accordingly that is the primary focus of this Section. For that reason, it is
perhaps helpful at the outset to say a few words on the vexed question of
statutory interpretation in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is, to some extent, its own
world. Bankruptcy courts are well-known for preferring purposivist
interpretations of the Code, and indeed, for creative decision-making that departs
from the underlying statutory text entirely.99 In effect, a popular narrative runs,
bankruptcy courts update the Code in real time, allowing for innovations that
facilitate efficient and successful reorganizations but that Congress can scarcely
be said to have intended or provided for in its original 1978 enactment.100 While
purposivist interpretation has far from disappeared in the higher courts,101 the
focus on the statutory text, particularly in the Supreme Court, has become
increasingly prominent.102 Although a simplification, it is not wholly unfair to
characterize the key dynamic of bankruptcy litigation as a push-pull between the
creative policy-driven rulings of the bankruptcy courts and the cold shock of
textualism that douses those courts in those rare cases in which a bankruptcy
dispute reaches the summit of the legal system.103
This Article does not fully embrace either approach. It more closely aligns
itself with a group of the Supreme Court’s recent bankruptcy decisions that,
although they may certainly be characterized as textualist decisions, are focused
on a structural approach to the Code.104 These decisions focus on the way the

99
See generally Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking
in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1–5 (2006) (discussing the debate over purposivism and textualism
in the bankruptcy context).
100
Id. at 1–2 (listing “common[] if contested” practices which, lacking specific statutory authorization,
bankruptcy courts have relied on equitable powers to approve).
101
See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1275–78 (2020)
(challenging the narrative that “purposivism is dead or dying”); Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All
Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 304–06 (2017) (detailing
Justice Kagan’s speech on Justice Scalia and his influence on the adoption of textualism by federal jurists).
102
Krishnakumar, supra note 101, at 1277–78.
103
The most forceful endorsement of textualism in a recent Supreme Court bankruptcy case was in Siegel,
in which the Supreme Court admonished the bankruptcy court for exercising its broad statutory and inherent
powers, and further held that it “may not contravene specific statutory provisions”. Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415,
421 (2014); see also Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 778 (2010) (“We conclude that the Court of Appeals’
approach fails to account for the text of the relevant Code provisions and misinterprets our decision in Taylor”);
but see Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375–76 (2007).
104
See, e.g., Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019); Czyzewski v.
Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017); and RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S.
639 (2012); cf. George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 347–50 (1995) (describing a
“holistic” approach to interpretation that “derives from examination of the statute’s overall structure” and
arguing that “[t]he structural approach is also textualist”).
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different provisions of the Code fit together, such that the resulting decision
gives effect to a statutory scheme that makes sense of the Code as a whole. In
each case, the Court takes the text of the statute seriously. But it also assumes
that Congress, in enacting the Code, “ha[d] a rational plan, that statutes are
meant to work,”105 and thus, that understanding the Code means understanding
the theories based on which it hangs together. So too does this Article. Presented
in this Article is a theory of the bankruptcy estate in debt adjustment bankruptcy
cases that I believe fits more neatly with the statutory text than any other
proposed theory. Beyond that, however, this Article also presents a broader
theory of how Congress intended debt adjustment bankruptcy to operate and
identifies how the individual components of each debt adjustment bankruptcy
case fit together to make a sensible whole.
A. The Life of the Chapter 13 Estate
That courts dispute the fate of the bankruptcy estate in chapter 13 cases
might seem surprising. After all, bankruptcy courts have easily been able to
reach consensus on the lifespan of the estate elsewhere. In chapter 7, any estate
property is liquidated and distributed to creditors (or, if of inconsequential value,
abandoned back to the debtor), after which the estate ceases to exist.106 In the
chapter 11 context, although the statute does not expressly say so, courts agree
that plan confirmation presumptively terminates the estate.107 In fact, chapter 11
specifies, in language that exactly parallels one of the provisions of chapter 13,
that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan,
the confirmation of a plan vests all property of the estate in the debtor.”108 That
provision is universally understood to mean that upon confirmation the
bankruptcy estate ceases to exist, property may no longer enter it, and the
property in the estate is either distributed to creditors under the plan or revested
in the debtor.109 In other words, the fate of the bankruptcy estate in chapter 7 and
in traditional chapter 11 is uncontroversial.110
105
See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era
of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 91 (2015).
106
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2019) (describing the effect of discharge).
107
See, e.g., In re Hillis Motors, 997 F.2d 581, 587 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154,
164–65 (3d Cir. 2004) (chapter 11 estate ceases to exist upon confirmation).
108
11 U.S.C. § 1141(b).
109
See In re Resorts Int’l, 372 F.3d at 164–165; In re Hillis Motors, 997 F.2d at 587 (pursuant to
section 1141(b), “confirmation usually terminates the existence of the estate”).
110
That does not mean that the business of bankruptcy is entirely done in chapter 11 cases upon
confirmation. Sometimes assets may be transferred to a liquidating trust, so a trustee can continue the business
of reducing them to cash in order to pay creditors even after the bankruptcy process itself is formally over. But
it is the trust instruments, rather than the law of bankruptcy or the bankruptcy estate, that prescribes the trustee’s
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The same cannot be said for the fate of the bankruptcy estate in chapter 13.
Rather, four theories have been advanced, each largely predicated on its own
distinct understanding of the basic logic of chapter 13, and each presenting
radically different consequences for the debtor, creditors, and the bankruptcy
court during the post-confirmation period. In brief introduction, I will defend the
estate termination theory: the notion that chapter 13 works exactly as in chapter
11. At plan confirmation, all property in the chapter 13 estate is transferred
absolutely to the chapter 13 debtor and the estate terminates. Its polar opposite
is the estate preservation theory, which states that no property is actually
transferred out of the bankruptcy estate until the very end of the case. One
intermediate approach is the estate reconciliation theory, which states that all
property of the estate vests in the debtor at plan confirmation. Rather than
terminating at plan confirmation, however, the estate continues to exist and is
refilled with any property the debtor acquires thereafter, including all of the
debtor’s post-confirmation wages. Finally, the estate transformation theory, a
similar intermediate approach, states that all property of the estate is transferred
to the debtor at plan confirmation except for property that is necessary to the
fulfilment of the chapter 13 plan.
Professor David Gray Carlson forcefully critiqued the estate preservation
and estate reconciliation theories.111 Carlson demonstrated how both theories do
substantial violence to the language of the Code, and both fail as a matter of
bankruptcy policy. Carlson defended a narrow version of the estate
transformation approach, in which the estate is largely terminated at plan
confirmation but continues to have authority over property that is actually paid
by the chapter 13 debtor to the trustee pursuant to the plan. I am largely in
agreement with Carlson’s criticisms of the estate preservation and estate
reconciliation theories, but I posit that Carlson does not go far enough. The
simplest and most elegant theory of the chapter 13 estate is that it terminates in
its entirety upon confirmation of the plan, absent some specific contrary court
order. After reviewing the most substantial flaws in the estate preservation and
estate reconciliation theories, this Section explains why the estate termination
theory is preferable to the limited estate transformation theory proposed by
Carlson.

actions in such a case. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. The question, therefore, is whether the postconfirmation world in chapter 13 looks similar—with a debtor’s continuing obligations governed not by
bankruptcy law itself, but by non-bankruptcy principles according to some agreement hashed out during the
bankruptcy case—or whether in chapter 13 the bankruptcy case itself, and the remit of bankruptcy law proper,
in continues onward following confirmation.
111
See Carlson, supra note 9, at 233–44.
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1. Estate Preservation
The stakes are perhaps best illustrated by beginning with the most expansive
theory of the chapter 13 estate—the so-called “estate preservation theory.” This
theory states that the chapter 13 estate survives plan confirmation and continues
in full effect until the conclusion of the chapter 13 case, whether that means the
completion of the debtor’s chapter 13 plan payments followed by entry of a
discharge, dismissal of the case, or conversion to chapter 7. Throughout that
entire period, all of the debtor’s property remains property of the chapter 13
estate, regardless of whether acquired before the bankruptcy petition was filed,
during the pre-confirmation period, or after confirmation of the plan.
Section 362(a)(3) of the Code prohibits creditors from exercising control
over property of the estate.112 Therefore, under the estate preservation theory, all
of the debtor’s property is subject to the protection of the automatic stay not only
vis-à-vis prepetition creditors provided for under the plan, but also against
postpetition creditors for the entire up-to-five year period of the bankruptcy case.
Even if the debtor fails to pay postpetition obligations as they become due,
postpetition creditors may not look to estate property unless they first appear in
the bankruptcy case and file a motion seeking permission to do so from the
bankruptcy court.113 The debtor is constrained from freely dealing with the
property; at a minimum, he must seek court approval for any disposition of the
property outside of the ordinary course of business.114 The property may
generate administrative expenses throughout that same period, entitled to
priority payment.115 And disputes regarding that property, at least in the first
instance, are decided by the bankruptcy court.116
Forcing creditors to go to the bankruptcy court post-confirmation is opposite
to what is required in a traditional chapter 11 case. Following confirmation,
under the ordinary rules of chapter 11 the bankruptcy estate “ceases to exist”117
112

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2019).
Precisely this question was at issue in the litigation giving rise to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Steenes I, 918 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2019). The debtors in that case took the position that the Bankruptcy Code
enabled them to postpone making any payments towards any parking tickets they were issued after the date of
filing of the bankruptcy case until completion of the chapter 13 plan; the City of Chicago, in the meantime, could
not take its ordinary steps to respond to non-payment of tickets—ordinarily, immobilizing and impounding the
debtors’ vehicles—without first securing an order granting relief from stay from the bankruptcy court. Id. at
557–58.
114
11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
115
Id. § 503(b)(1)(A) (providing that “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate”
may be entitled to administrative expense status.); cf. Steenes II, 942 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2019).
116
See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
117
In re Resort’s Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 2004).
113
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absent a specific order from the bankruptcy court that preserves the estate for a
limited purpose.118 The estate preservation theory argues that chapter 13 must
differ from traditional chapter 11 in order to remain faithful to the text of the
Code, particularly section 1306. That provision states that “[p]roperty of the
estate includes . . . earnings from services performed by the debtor after
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted
to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first.”119
The apparent breadth of section 1306 has led some bankruptcy courts to
conclude that throughout the bankruptcy case the chapter 13 estate must persist
in its original form as a repository for all of the debtor’s property. As one
bankruptcy court observed:
the clear language of § 1306 demonstrates that confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan is not relevant to determining whether property is or
is not property of the estate. The relevant events in this determination
are commencement of the case and either dismissal, closing or
conversion of the case. If Congress had intended for confirmation to
so drastically affect the expansive definition of property of the estate
found in § 1306, it knew how to draft such a provision.120

Such an interpretation of the Code is hard to square with section 1327’s
direction that property of the estate “vests” in the debtor.121 Courts adopting the
estate preservation theory generally acknowledge that the ordinary meaning of
“vesting” of estate property in the debtor is to transfer that property to the debtor
and thus out of the bankruptcy estate.122 But they conclude that “vest” must mean
something else in the context of chapter 13.123 “Vesting” is thus argued to mean
a “fixing of rights” to property rather than a “transfer” of that property to the
debtor.124 Thus, as viewed by some courts, the debtor is vested with property of
the estate after plan confirmation because he then acquires “authority . . . to
propose a sale or encumbrance of estate property. . . .”125 In the view of other
118

See, e.g., In re Neptune World Wide Moving, Inc., 111 B.R. 457, 462–63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
11 U.S.C. § 1306(b).
120
In re Aneiro, 72 B.R. 424, 429 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987).
121
11 U.S.C. § 1327(b)
122
In re Fisher, 198 B.R. 721, 733 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996), rev’d, 203 B.R. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see
Security Bank of Marshalltown, Iowa v. Neiman, 1 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that the effect
of plan confirmation in chapter 11 cases is to “vest” all property of the estate, transforming such property into
property of the debtor).
123
Neiman, 1 F.3d at 691 (“We think that the opposing line of cases is ‘premised upon the mistaken belief
that revesting under § 1327(b) transforms property of the estate into property of the debtor.’”) (quoting In re
Aneiro, 72 B.R. at 428–29).
124
In re Fisher, 198 B.R. at 733.
125
Id.
119
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courts, the debtor is vested with property of the estate after plan confirmation
because the debtor is then acquires “the right to future of enjoyment of the assets
in that estate” “once he faithfully completes his obligations under the plan and
is entitled to the discharge.”126 In either case, the estate, however, remains intact
after confirmation.127
Although the chief argument in favor of the estate preservation theory is that
it is textually preferable, giving “full effect” to section 1306, bankruptcy courts
have also advanced policy arguments in favor of a long-lived chapter 13
estate.128 Fundamental to the position of those courts is the right of the chapter
13 debtor to convert his bankruptcy case to chapter 7.129 When a debtor converts
his bankruptcy case from chapter 13 to chapter 7, he agrees to permit liquidation
of his property rather than continuing to repay his creditors over time from future
income; property of the estate in the converted chapter 7 case consists of
property, “as of the date of the filing of the petition, that remains in the
possession of or is under the control of the debtor on the date of conversion.”130
Nothing in the text of the Code, therefore, requires there to be an estate in
existence at the time of conversion to provide assets for the chapter 7 trustee to
liquidate.131 Property that the debtor owned at the time of the original filing of
his chapter 13 bankruptcy case becomes property of the estate in the converted
chapter 7 case regardless of whether the chapter 13 estate exists at the time of
conversion. But, because dispositions of estate property outside the ordinary
126
Woodard v. Taco Bueno Restaurants, Inc., 2006 WL 3542693, at *26 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2006). The
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey subscribes to a similar view:

At confirmation, the “vesting” of property of the estate in the debtor, as provided in § 1327(b),
means that the debtor’s rights and interest in the property become fixed as of the confirmation of
the plan, and are effected when the provisions of the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan are satisfied. . . .
The act of confirmation ‘vests’ all of the property of the estate in the debtor to allow the debtor
to take the necessary steps to comply with the confirmed plan. The statute does not state that the
event of confirmation changes the characterization of the property from property of the estate
into property of the debtor. Instead, it merely confirms the debtor’s ability to utilize property of
the estate, notwithstanding that designation, in satisfaction of the debtor’s obligations under the
confirmed plan.
In re Tarby, 2012 WL 1390201, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2012) (internal citations omitted).
127
See In re Fisher, 198 B.R. at 733.
128
Id. at 727–31.
129
See, e.g., id. at 731.
130
11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A) (2019).
131
In a case of bad faith conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7, the Bankruptcy Code does provide that
property of the estate in the new chapter 7 case shall comprise whatever property existed in the chapter 13 estate
at the time of conversion. Id. § 348(f)(2). As will be discussed below, this provision does cause some difficulties
for the estate termination theory which this Article defends. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. The
rarity of post-confirmation bad faith conversions from chapter 13 to chapter 7, and the availability of other
remedies to address such bad faith when it occurs, help to alleviate these problems.
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course require the bankruptcy court’s approval pursuant to section 363 of the
Code,132 keeping property within the estate after conversion prevents the debtor
from dissipating it while his chapter 13 case remains ongoing.133 “[B]ecause of
the continuing right of the debtor to convert a Chapter 13 case after plan
confirmation, the role of the estate as a reserve source of creditor payments
continues after confirmation . . . the estate itself must continue, subject to the
protections of the Code, undiminished by the confirmation.”134
Carlson’s article comprehensively sets forth reasons for rejecting the estate
preservation theory.135 Most importantly, the estate preservation theory seems
too implausible as a textual matter to pass muster. Describing the vesting of
property of the estate as merely conferring upon the debtor a right to possession
of such property, or to make dispositions of that property subject to bankruptcy
court approval, does not give adequate meaning to the statutory language. The
debtor already has each of those rights during the pre-confirmation period.136
Section 1306(b) confirms the debtor’s right to remain in possession of property
of the estate at that time, and nothing in sections 363(b) or 1303 indicates that
the right of a debtor to propose dispositions of property of the estate is one that
comes into effect only after plan confirmation.137 Moreover, the narrow reading
of “vest” proposed by advocates of the estate preservation theory is entirely
inconsistent with what that term is universally understood to mean when used
elsewhere in the Code.138 In short, “‘vesting’ is a clumsy way of saying
‘transferring absolutely.’ Otherwise, ‘vesting’ means nothing at all.”139

132

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
The Fisher bankruptcy court recited the consequences that would follow from permitting an
“emancipated” chapter 13 debtor post-confirmation to “treat property of the estate as if no bankruptcy had ever
occurred.” In re Fisher, 198 B.R. at 731. If that were the case,
133

after confirmation, a Chapter 13 debtor could (1) sell any unencumbered assets, (2) expend funds
outside the ordinary course, (3) incur any kind of credit, including credit secured by
unencumbered assets, and (4) pay legal fees to bankruptcy counsel—all without notice to any
party involved in the bankruptcy and with no opportunity for a court hearing. If the debtor were
operating a business, there would be no need to report on its operation. And finally, postpetition
creditors, like the City of Chicago in the present case, would be free to enforce claims against the
debtor’s property, again without any notice to parties involved in the bankruptcy.
Id.
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 732.
Carlson, supra note 9, at 240–42.
See supra notes 58–62.
Carlson, supra note 9, at 241.
Carlson, supra note 9, at 242.
Carlson, supra note 9, at 242.
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Nor is preserving the chapter 13 estate for the benefit of creditors in a future
chapter 7 case sound policy. Such an approach is inconsistent with the fresh
start—one of the most basic policies animating bankruptcy law—and the chapter
13 bargain. The chapter 13 debtor promises to devote all of his future disposable
income to repayment of creditors in exchange for the right to retain the property
he owns at the time he files for relief.140 But under the estate preservation theory,
he does not really “keep” that property. Instead, all of his property is subject to
a five-year guardianship overseen by the bankruptcy court, not because such
oversight is necessary to serve the purposes of his chapter 13 case, but as a
safeguard in case he chooses to abandon chapter 13 and resort to chapter 7. Such
oversight serves only to safeguard creditors against the substantially more
remote possibility of a bad faith conversion. Because the converted chapter 7
estate, in most cases, encompasses only property that the debtor owned or
possessed at the time the bankruptcy case was commenced, retaining all of the
property that the debtor acquires after that time within the estate does not even
serve the purpose of protecting creditors against an ordinary conversion.141 The
plain text of chapter 13 ensures that when a debtor completes his chapter 13 plan,
the general body of creditors are better off than if he had originally pursued
chapter 7 liquidation. Rejecting the estate preservation theory means imposing
upon creditors some risk that, if the debtor later chooses to convert, they will
receive less than they would have received in an earlier liquidation. But it is
hardly unfair to require creditors to bear that risk. Those creditors also gained
the benefit of the greater upside potential afforded by the debtor’s decision to
first attempt to seek relief under chapter 13.
2. Estate Reconciliation
The estate reconciliation theory attempts to grapple with the apparent
inconsistency created by sections 1306 and 1327 of the Code more carefully than
the estate preservation theory, although it too ultimately falls short.142 The estate
140
See Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015) (“Proceedings under Chapter 13 can benefit
debtors and creditors alike. Debtors are allowed to retain their assets, commonly their home or car.”)
141
11 U.S.C. § 348 (2019).
142
Courts that have adopted the estate reconciliation theory include the First Circuit, Barbosa v. Solomon,
235 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2000), and the Eleventh Circuit, In re Waldron, 536 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2008), as well
as a substantial number of bankruptcy and district courts. See also In re Gonzales, 587 B.R. 363, 369 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 2018) (noting the theory has “garnered a wide following” and citing cases); In re Wei-Fung Chang, 438
B.R. 77, 82–83 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010); In re Powers, 435 B.R. 385, 389 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010); see generally
Peter Carpio & Jeffrey L. Cohen, Modified Estate Transformation: When Does a Chapter 13 Estate Terminate,
7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 213 (1999) (advocating for theory under label of modified estate transformation).
The theory appears to have originated in the decision of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
In re Fisher, 203 B.R. 958 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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reconciliation theory acknowledges that to revest property of the estate in the
debtor must mean to transfer that property to the debtor absolutely, such that the
property exits the bankruptcy estate. 143 But it posits that revesting occurs only
for property actually within the estate at the time the chapter 13 plan is
confirmed.144 Section 1327 means that at the time of plan confirmation, all of
the property in the bankruptcy estate is transferred out of the estate and back to
the debtor, leaving the bankruptcy estate empty. That property is no longer
protected by the automatic stay, and the debtor may deal with it as he chooses.
But section 1327 has no further effect after the time of plan confirmation.
Section 1306 provides that the estate includes property acquired by the debtor at
any time “before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted.”145 The estate
reconciliation theory argues, therefore, that after confirmation the estate refills
with property that the debtor acquires from the date of confirmation forward.146
Any property that the debtor acquires from the day after the plan is confirmed
until the time his bankruptcy case is concluded becomes property of the estate.
The debtor must apply for court permission to use that property outside of the
ordinary course of business, just as he was obligated to do for all of his
prepetition property during the period before plan confirmation. And, as
property of the estate, property acquired after plan confirmation is protected by
the automatic stay. In the view of its progenitor, the Northern District of Illinois
in Fisher, this interpretation “reconciles the text of the governing statutes
without contradicting the language of any provision and without fatally
undermining any important policy considerations.”147
But the claim that the estate reconciliation theory resolves the textualist
conundrum posed by sections 1306 and 1327 does not hold water. Section 1327
vests “all of the property of the estate” in the debtor.148 Nothing in section 1327,
nor in the provisions of section 541 and 1306 that set forth what assets shall
comprise property of the estate, indicates that the time at which that property is
acquired should have any effect on whether that property is property of the
143
See In re Fisher, 203 B.R. at 962; Carpio & Cohen, supra note 142, at 230 (arguing that “property
vesting in the debtor is no longer ‘property of the estate.’”).
144
See, e.g., In re Fisher, 203 B.R. at 962; Barbosa, 235 F.3d at 36–37 (holding that “property of the estate
at the time of confirmation vests in the debtors free and clear of any claims from the creditors”) (emphasis
added).
145
11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2019).
146
In re Waldron, 536 F.3d at 1243 (“As one court has explained, some property of the estate is vested in
the debtor at confirmation, under section 1327(b), but property acquired later vests in the estate, under section
1306(a), until the case ends or is converted” (citing In re Fisher, 203 B.R. at 962); see also Barbosa, 235 F.3d
at 36–37.
147
In re Fisher, 203 B.R. at 964.
148
11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (emphasis added).
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estate. The estate reconciliation theory, therefore, continues, albeit only in part,
to disregard the clear direction to revest the debtor with his property set forth in
section 1327(b).
An occasional rejoinder to this critique is that section 1327(b) cannot, at the
time of plan confirmation, vest the debtor with earnings or other property that
he has not yet acquired.149 In other words, “property acquired after confirmation
is not subject to § 1327(b) because it was not in existence at confirmation.
Therefore . . . § 1306(a) must place this property in the estate.”150 But that cannot
be correct. The law frequently recognizes that interests in after-acquired
property can be transferred.151 There is no reason why confirmation of a plan
that vests in the debtor all property of the estate cannot transfer to the debtor
rights to those same after-acquired assets.
Although textually unsatisfying, the estate reconciliation theory’s real flaws
are practical in nature. It poses formidable administrative difficulties. Imagine a
debtor who files for bankruptcy with a bank account into which his monthly
wages are deposited. Any cash that accumulates in the bank account during the
pre-confirmation period revests in the debtor upon confirmation and is no longer
property of the estate. But income the debtor earns following confirmation is
property of the estate. Months after confirmation, however, as money has been
spent and deposited, it will be all but impossible for the bankruptcy court—let
alone a financially unsophisticated debtor—to know which funds are the
debtor’s free and clear, and which are property of the bankruptcy estate. The
distinction, of course, matters. The debtor who wants to make a down payment
on a new car must take care to secure bankruptcy court approval before using
estate property for such a transaction but is perfectly free to use his own funds
for that purpose.152
At root, the estate reconciliation theory simply makes little sense.153 Debtors
in chapter 13 cases frequently file for relief because they hope to keep valuable
149
In re Waldron, 536 F.3d at 1243 (“New assets that a debtor acquires unexpectedly after confirmation
by definition do not exist at confirmation and cannot be returned to him then.”); In re Wei-Fung Chang, 438
B.R. 77, 83 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010).
150
In re Wei-Fung Chang, 438 B.R. at 83.
151
For example, a debtor can grant a security interest in assets it will acquire in the future—in other words,
a “floating lien”. See U.C.C. § 9-204.
152
In re Wei-Fung Chang, 438 B.R. at 83 (concluding that property acquired post-confirmation is property
of the estate, but noting that “it is unrealistic to expect a Chapter 13 debtor, who may retain possession of his
property and property of the estate for as long as five years, to keep track of how each asset is titled to ensure
that he does not dispose of estate property without court approval”).
153
See Carlson, supra note 9, at 250 (“[I]f the debtor buys a car after the confirmation of the plan, the car
belongs to the bankruptcy estate. The debtor dares not sell the car without court permission pursuant to section
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assets—typically a home or a vehicle.154 Those assets are returned to the debtor
free and clear within weeks or months of his bankruptcy filing, as soon as his
chapter 13 plan is confirmed. Absent a windfall, those assets are likely to be far
more valuable than anything the debtor acquires in the post-confirmation period,
while he is devoting his disposable income to the repayment of creditors under
the plan. The estate reconciliation theory, therefore, does not even succeed at
protecting the debtor like the estate preservation theory does. Postpetition
creditors are free to pursue the debtor’s house, car, or other prepetition property.
Even so, it deviates from the simple rule of traditional chapter 11 in retaining
after-acquired assets captive within the bankruptcy estate. “The Christmas after
confirmation is a sad one under this theory, as the [estate] scoops up all the
presents under the tree.”155 That retention, however, serves no readily
discernible purpose. The debtor’s fresh start is frustrated by the continued
shadow of the estate, but the debtor still likely does not enjoy meaningful
protection from postpetition creditors. If any property is to remain in the
bankruptcy estate following confirmation, it must be pursuant to some more
carefully calibrated rationale.
3. Estate Transformation
A third collection of theories, here described under the umbrella term of
“estate transformation”, holds that confirmation of the chapter 13 plan serves to
transfer property of the estate to the debtor except for a limited category of
property somehow related to fulfilment of the chapter 13 plan. The version of
this theory most often adopted by bankruptcy courts argues that property of the
estate revests in the debtor upon plan confirmation, except for property that is
necessary for execution of the plan. A debtor with total monthly wages of $3,000
and a monthly payment under his chapter 13 plan of $500 might receive $2,500
each month absolutely, while $500 each month becomes property of the estate
upon payment to the debtor. At some point, courts adopting this approach

363(b). But, the preconfirmation car could be sold post-confirmation without court permission.”). Even greater
confusion abounds if one concludes that proceeds of the sale of the pre-confirmation vehicle, as assets acquired
by the debtor after confirmation, become property of the estate. Carlson, supra note 9, at 250. Under that view,
the debtor obtains, in effect, the right to deal only with the “first generation” of property he owned at the time of
confirmation, but as soon as he sells property or exchanges one asset for another, section 1306 captures the new
property for the estate and prevents him from any further dealings without first seeking court permission.
154
Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015).
155
See Carlson, supra note 9, at 250.
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included the Eleventh Circuit and bankruptcy courts within that jurisdiction,156
and, on one reading of the leading opinion, the Seventh Circuit.157
This approach suffers from similar practical flaws to the estate reconciliation
theory. The debtor may frequently face great difficulty in actually understanding
which of the assets he possesses are property of the estate, and which are his
absolutely. There are several reasons for the debtor’s confusion.
First, the criterion of “necessity” to execution of the plan may itself be
difficult to apply.158 The debtor will need to understand whether the “necessary”
funds are limited to the precise amount of his monthly plan payment, or whether
the bankruptcy court may find that it is necessary to retain additional funds
within the estate to ensure that the debtor’s ability to make plan payments is not
disturbed by some unexpected expense.
Second, as with the estate reconciliation theory, even assuming the debtor
and bankruptcy court are able to calculate what proportion of the debtor’s wages
or other income are necessary to the fulfilment of the plan and thus remain in
the estate, actually identifying the amount of estate property within the debtor’s
156
Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Jemison, 2007 WL
2669222, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007). The Eleventh Circuit later largely abandoned this approach in favor of
the estate reconciliation approach. See In re Waldron, 536 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008)
157
In re Heath, 115 F.3d 521, 522–24 (7th Cir. 1997). In Heath, Judge Posner wrote in a short and
somewhat cryptic opinion that the combined effect of sections 1306 and 1327 of the Code was that “while the
filing of the petition for bankruptcy places all of the property of the debtor in the control of the bankruptcy court,
the plan upon confirmation returns so much of that property to the debtor’s control as is not necessary to the
fulfillment of the plan.” Id. These dicta are at least consistent with the estate transformation approach—although
the opinion can also plausibly be read as concluding, consistent with the approach advocated by this Article, that
the chapter 13 estate ordinarily terminates in its entirety upon confirmation, but may be preserved postconfirmation by means of a specific provision included in the plan or confirmation order only to include property
necessary to fulfilment of the chapter 13 plan. Id. (“[C]onfirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate
in the debtor unless the plan provides otherwise”) (emphasis in original).
158
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia discussed the difficulty of applying the
necessity criterion:

There is also a practicable problem inherent in limiting the post-confirmation estate only to
property necessary for the success of the chapter 13 plan. What property is necessary for the
success of the chapter 13 plan? In a joint case, in the absence of a wage order under § 1325(c),
which debtor’s wages are protected by the automatic stay? In an individual case where the debtor
holds more than one job, which paycheck is necessary for the success of the chapter 13
plan? Which one is not protected by the automatic stay and is subject to garnishment? There is
nothing that distinguishes the debtor’s paycheck from the co-debtor’s paycheck or the debtor’s
primary paycheck from his secondary paycheck.
In re Reynard, 250 B.R. 241, 248 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000). The District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
arrived at a similar result. See Thompson v. Quarles, 392 B.R. 517, 522 (S.D. Ga. 2008) (“[I]t is unclear when
the new asset is ‘necessary’ to fund the ‘plan’ and whether the ‘plan’ is the original, previously confirmed plan,
or a modified version of the confirmed plan that accounts for the value of the post-petition cause of action.”).
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possession at any given time will frequently be an insurmountable task. Funds
necessary to make plan payments have no “independent identity” that makes
them readily distinguishable from other funds belong to the debtor.159 This
variant of the estate transformation theory is viable only in a world in which the
debtor’s assets are not comingled and property necessary to the fulfilment of the
plan is carefully segregated from all the debtor’s other property. Needless to say,
this ideal is unlikely to reflect the reality in which most chapter 13 debtors
manage their affairs.
Carlson defends a slightly different version of the estate transformation
theory. Adopting the label of the “divestment theory,” Carlson proposes that the
chapter 13 estate terminates upon confirmation except for “funds the debtor
successfully transmits to the chapter 13 trustee for the benefit of creditors.”160
This theory narrows the scope of the post-confirmation estate even further. The
chapter 13 estate does not include any of the debtor’s post-confirmation wages
or other income at the time those funds come into his hands. Rather, only at the
time the debtor actually makes his chapter 13 plan payments are the funds
transformed into property of the estate.161
Carlson’s thesis is almost correct. Post-confirmation, property of the estate
certainly does not encompass the debtor’s prepetition property, or future income
or other property that the debtor acquires and keeps postpetition. It also does not
include, at least by default, that portion of the debtor’s income that he intends to
pay—or actually does pay—to the chapter 13 trustee. Carlson does not explain
why he concludes that the chapter 13 estate post-confirmation must include
funds in the hands of the chapter 13 trustee. Instead, it appears Carlson considers
it self-evident that there must be some form of estate post-confirmation, and that
the narrowest (and therefore most plausible) potential scope for such an estate is
property actually in the hands of the chapter 13 trustee. Carlson’s thesis,
although more restrictive in scope than the alternatives discussed so far,
ultimately fails to grapple with the question of why there must be a postconfirmation estate at all.

159
In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 16–17 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990); In re Reynard, 250 B.R. at 248 (“Money
is fungible.”).
160
Carlson, supra note 9, at 233.
161
In many districts, chapter 13 plans operate pursuant to wage garnishment orders which instruct the
debtor’s employer to turn over the portion of the debtor’s wages necessary to fund the plan directly to the chapter
13 trustee. See Greene, Patel & Porter, supra note 2, at 1066–67 (discussing differences in local practice as to
employee wage orders). In such districts, there may be little practical difference in the way that Carlson’s
conception of the estate transformation theory operates compared to that described by the Eleventh Circuit in its
Telfair decision and perhaps also contemplated by the Seventh Circuit in Heath.
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Although Carlson rejects the label, it is fair to say that his theory does
involve a “transformation” in the nature of the estate. Adopting Carlson’s view,
prior to confirmation, the estate chiefly comprises property in the hands of the
debtor. At that time, the estate serves as a device limiting the debtor’s ability to
deal with that property (while protecting the property from postpetition creditors
who might wish to pursue it). Following confirmation, property is within the
bankruptcy estate only when it is in the hands of the trustee. The purpose of
retaining an estate of such limited scope is unclear. And nothing in the Code
alludes to or purports to provide for such a transformation. The thesis rests, at
best, uneasily with the statutory provisions at issue. Unlike the distinction
between pre-confirmation and post-confirmation property made by the estate
reconciliation theory, the distinction between property in the hands of the debtor
and property in the hands of the trustee cannot be traced back to section 1327(b).
If anything, because section 1306(b) of the Code contemplates that the debtor
shall remain in possession of property of the estate, Carlson’s divestment theory
reverses the scheme contemplated by the Code.162
Other courts, advocating for a variety of theories of chapter 13, have argued
that the chapter 13 estate must survive confirmation in some form in order for
the trustee to perform her duties. Defending the broader estate transformation
theory, one bankruptcy court observed that:
If there is no existing estate upon confirmation, then what does the
Chapter 13 Trustee administer? If there is no estate over which the
Chapter 13 Trustee has control, then that Trustee is nothing more than
an officious intermeddler. Even 11 U.S.C. § 704(9), (made applicable
to Chapter 13 Trustees by 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1)), provides that the
Trustee shall “... make a final report and file a final account of the
administration of the estate [emphasis added] with the court.” There
must be an “estate” upon and after confirmation, and that estate

162
One potential textual hook for the divestment theory is section 1322(a)(1) of the Code. 11 U.S.C.
1322(a)(1) (2019). That section provides that the portion of the debtor’s future income necessary to fulfil the
plan shall be submitted “to the supervision and control of the trustee.” Id. Potentially, that section could be
construed to provide a basis for a transformation in the estate at confirmation to include property necessary to
the fulfilment of the plan. That reading of section 1322(a)(1), however, misreads the Code. Nothing in section
1322(a)(1) specifies that the property identified must remain in—or become a part of—the bankruptcy estate.
Rather, section 1322 quite clearly contemplates that non-estate property may be involved in the postconfirmation payment of creditors. Id. § 1322. Section 1322(b)(9) speaks, without qualification, of property of
the estate revesting upon plan confirmation. Section 1322(b)(8), meanwhile, provides that claims against the
debtor may be paid “from property of the estate or property of the debtor”—from which follows the inference
that there is no necessary connection between plan payments and the estate. Id.
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consists of the property and future earnings of the debtor dedicated to
fulfillment of the Chapter 13 Plan.163

Carlson criticized the notion that the existence of an estate requires identifying
any property in the hands of the debtor post-confirmation as property of the
estate.164 In effect, however, Carlson’s article concludes that the property in the
hands of the trustee belongs in the estate for the same reason: there must be an
estate somewhere after confirmation in order for the trustee to do her job.165 But
there is no need for a bankruptcy estate to source the chapter 13 trustee’s
obligations. Rather, her obligations in the post-confirmation world come from
the same source as those of every other party to the bankruptcy case: the plan. It
is the plan that directs how much she should collect each month from the debtor,
and to whom she should pay those funds. Thus, from the inception of the Code,
the trustee’s role in the post-confirmation world has been described as that of a
“disbursing agent.”166 The Bankruptcy Rules similarly describe the trustee’s role
in collecting and distributing funds to creditors in accordance with the plan,
again without reference to a surviving bankruptcy estate.167
Indeed, chapter 11 already offers an analog. Frequently, parties to a
commercial chapter 11 case will have agreed upon a basic scheme of distribution
before the assets to be distributed among creditors have been reduced to cash or
otherwise become ready for distribution. The chapter 11 estate might, for
example, possess a valuable cause of action against a third party which has not
yet been litigated to judgment or settlement. Alternatively, the plan might
contemplate that an unprofitable line of business will be liquidated, and the cash
realized thereby distributed to creditors, without the debtor-in-possession having
completed the process of selling off assets. For many years, a common solution
in such cases has been to confirm a chapter 11 plan that transfers the assets in
question to a trust.168 The estate, as is usual in chapter 11 cases, still terminates
upon plan confirmation, but a litigation or liquidating trustee is appointed to
administer the new trust. The plan will specify how proceeds of the trust are to
163

In re Root, 61 B.R. 984, 985 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
Carlson, supra note 9, at 274.
165
Carlson, supra note 9, at 273–74.
166
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 430 (1977) (“After confirmation of a plan, the court may order any entity
from whom the debtor receives income to pay it, or part of it, to the trustee, who will serve as the disbursing
agent under 1326.”); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1326 (16th ed. 2020) (similar).
167
FED. R BANKR. P. 3021 (“Except as provided in Rule 3020(e), after a plan is confirmed, distribution
shall be made to creditors whose claims have been allowed, to interest holders whose interests have not been
disallowed, and to indenture trustees who have filed claims under Rule 3003(c)(5) that have been allowed.”).
168
See generally David Kuney, Liquidation Trusts and the Quagmire of Postconfirmation Jurisdiction:
The Case of the Disappearing Estate, 14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 ART. 3 (2005) (discussing considerations and
the issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction for liquidating trust cases).
164
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be distributed. The source of that trustee’s obligations is not, therefore,
bankruptcy law governing administration of the bankruptcy estate. It is the
chapter 11 plan itself, together with any documents drafted and executed
pursuant to the plan that establish and regulate the trust in more detail. In sum,
it is already commonplace in chapter 11, following plan confirmation, for a
trustee to administer a corpus of property that is not part of the bankruptcy estate.
Chapter 13 should be no different.
To the extent there is any uncertainty regarding the detail of the trustee’s
post-confirmation obligations, agency law can fill in the gaps.169 Why the
drafters of the Code chose to liken the trustee to a “disbursing agent” is not
entirely clear; the general common law of agency does not identify a disbursing
agent as a category of agent with distinct or specific obligations.170 But the duties
of a chapter 13 trustee are like enough to at least one familiar category of agent
to supply any legal rules necessary to elucidate the trustee’s role. The Second
Restatement of the Law of Agency describes an “escrow holder” as a person
who receives:
money . . . delivered to . . . the holder [] by another and which the
holder contracts to retain until the happening or non-happening of an
event; if the event happens, or fails to happen, before a specified time,
the escrow is to be delivered to a third person; otherwise he is to return
it to the depositor.171

So too the chapter 13 trustee retains money paid by the chapter 13 debtor until
plan confirmation,172 following which she begins distribution of funds on hands
to creditors in accordance with the terms of the confirmed plan. Upon other
triggering events—principally dismissal or conversion of the case—the trustee
instead returns funds currently on hand to the debtor.173 Since it is also generally
understood that the chapter 13 trustee is a fiduciary,174 the law of fiduciary duties
can similarly provide the detail necessary for the trustee to understand her duties
without post-confirmation reference to the concept of the bankruptcy estate.

169
The Code retains “long-established” and “familiar” common law principles except to the extent
disturbed for some statutory purpose. See Isbrandtsen v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
170
Neither the Second nor the Third Restatements of the Law of Agency use the term. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY (AM. L. INST. 1958); See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (AM. L. INST. 2006).
171
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: AGENT OR ESCROW HOLDER § 14D cmt. a. (AM. L. INST. 1958).
172
11 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2019).
173
See Harris v. Viegelahn, 135 S. Ct. 1829 (2015) (holding that conversion terminates the services of the
chapter 13 trustee and thus requires her to return any funds on hand at that time to the debtor).
174
See, e.g., In re Gutierrez, 309 B.R. 488, 499 n. 20–21 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004); In re Morgan, 353
B.R. 599, 605 (E.D. Ark. 2006); In re DiRuzzo, 513 B.R. 422, 429 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2014).
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Precisely identifying the best common law analog to the chapter 13 trustee
is not the focus of this Article. The point is that multiple sources of law—the
law of contracts, since the confirmed plan is recognized by all to be a contract;
the law of fiduciary duties; and the law of agency and escrow—supply the
principles necessary to define the trustee’s task and resolve any uncertainties
about how she is to perform it. The estate is an unnecessary concept postconfirmation. And no courts or commentators have successfully explained what
benefits are gained by straining the statutory language to insist that the estate
remains open, by default, as to the narrow category of property necessary to or
actually used for the fulfilment of the plan, while other property of the estate
revests in the debtor. The estate transformation and divestment theories,
therefore, also do not successfully account for the structure of chapter 13.
4. Estate Termination
The best theory of chapter 13, then, is this: following confirmation of a plan,
absent some contrary provision of the plan or confirmation order, the estate
simply terminates. Chapter 13 operates no differently than chapter 11 in this
regard—a conclusion that makes sense, given that chapter 13 is the “‘personal
reorganization’ counterpart to the better-known Chapter 11.”175 All property
within the estate at the time of plan confirmation revests in the debtor, and no
additional property enters the bankruptcy estate thereafter. In the chapter 11
context, courts have not hesitated to conclude that the overall structure of the
Code makes clear that the bankruptcy estate terminates upon confirmation.
Although only a limited number of courts have adopted this approach in chapter
13, it best fits with the statutory text and structure in that context also.176
The estate termination theory is strongly supported by the legislative history.
The drafters of the Code did not comment on the lifespan of the chapter 13 estate
in the sections of the legislative history specifically discussing sections 1306 and
1327 of the Code—as, indeed, they similarly did not comment on the lifespan of
the chapter 11 estate in discussing section 1141. Legislative history does,
however, address the lifespan of the chapter 13 estate when considering whether

175
In re Heath, 115 F.3d 521, 522 (7th Cir. 1997); see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶1300.01 (16th
ed. 2020) (chapter 13 is “quite similar to chapter 11, with which it shares many concepts”).
176
See, e.g., In re Jones, 420 B.R. 506, 515 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (adopting estate termination approach);
see also In re Petruccelli, 113 B.R. 5, 16–17 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990); In re Sihabouth, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 2870,
at *7–8 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014); In re Matthews, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 117, at *15–16 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2017); In
re Clark, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3564, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015); In re Dagen, 386 B.R. 777, 782 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 2008); In re Toth, 193 B.R. 992, 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996), overruled by In re Waldron, 536 F.3d 1239
(11th Cir. 2008) and Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
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that estate should be treated as a separate taxable entity from the debtor. That
was thought to be unnecessary, because the chapter 13 estate was expected to be
short-lived. The House Judiciary Committee report explained that “[t]he
administrative reality [is] that most Chapter 13 estates will only remain open for
1 or 2 months until confirmation of the plan at which time section 1327(b) of
title 11 will almost always revest title to property of the estate in the debtor.”177
Thus, the House report concluded, “[t]he duration of a chapter 13 case is so short
that there is no reason to impose a duty to pay taxes on the trustee.”178 The
legislative history demonstrates a contemporary understanding that revesting
property of the estate in the debtor meant the closing of the estate, and not merely
a grant of a right of possession of property of the estate or the transformation of
the estate into some other form. All the available evidence suggests, therefore,
that Congress anticipated that the chapter 13 estate would terminate upon
confirmation of the plan.179
Not all the consequences of estate termination may be welcome for every
debtor and creditor. As I have explained, estate termination frees the debtor to
deal with her property as she chooses. But it also frees postpetition creditors to
177

H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 276, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6233.
Id. at 277. It is clear that by “duration of a chapter 13 case,” the House report meant the time until a
plan is confirmed, not the time until plan payments are completed and the debtor receives a discharge. The
committee understood that plan payments were likely to continue for a number of years after the commencement
of the bankruptcy case. See id. at 276. Rather, it viewed the chapter 13 case as giving the debtor a brief “breathing
spell in which to reach an arrangement with creditors,” noting that this period would be short because “[t]he plan
is filed very rapidly.” Id.
179
To be sure, even the most persuasive interpretation of the Code, the “estate termination” model has its
imperfections. The chief anomaly created by the estate termination model relates to section 348(f) of the Code,
which governs conversions by a debtor from a chapter 13 case to chapter 7 case that occur in bad faith. Normally,
when a debtor converts a case from chapter 13 to chapter 7, the estate in the new chapter 7 case comprises only
property that was contained in the estate at the time the bankruptcy case was originally filed. 11 U.S.C.
§ 348(f)(1)(A) (2019). Even though section 1306 means that, prior to confirmation, property acquired after the
bankruptcy filing is added to the estate, that property is not included in the chapter 7 estate. In a case of bad faith
conversion, the Code provides that the “property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of property of
the estate as of the date of conversion.” Id. § 348(f)(2). Prior to confirmation, that simply serves to render all of
the debtor’s property, whether acquired prepetition or postpetition, property of the new chapter 7 estate. Postconfirmation, under the estate termination theory, however, there may be no property within the chapter 13
estate. It seems clear that Congress intended, in a case of bad faith conversion, that all of the debtor’s property,
whenever acquired, should be part of the new chapter 7 estate. Section 348(f) was added to the Bankruptcy Code
in 1994, after at least some courts had adopted a practice of maintaining all property within the estate throughout
the chapter 7 case. See, e.g., Security Bank of Marshalltown v. Neiman, 1 F.3d 687, 690–91 (8th Cir. 1993). The
anomaly created here, however, is not a grave one. Confirmation of a chapter 13 plan requires a determination
from the bankruptcy court that the chapter 13 case has been proceeding in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). It
seems unlikely that a debtor who had previously proposed and been performing under a plan good faith will
subsequently affect a bad faith conversion. And in any event, the bankruptcy court always retains the power to
sanction a debtor for bad faith conduct by dismissing the case or denying the debtor a discharge. Id. §§ 707(3)(a),
727.
178
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pursue the debtor’s assets without first seeking court permission. For some of
the debtor’s new creditors, this will be of little effect. Ordinary unsecured
creditors will likely need to invoke some other court process before they have
any opportunity to force repayment of a debt—for example, by getting a
judgment against the debtor in state court and securing a wage garnishment
order. But a new secured creditor of the debtor will be able to exercise ordinary
self-help remedies: for example, if the debtor who bought a truck postconfirmation and falls behind on his payments will find that the auto lender can
repossess the truck just as it would have outside of bankruptcy.
Other creditors may have similar self-help remedies. The Seventh Circuit in
its Steenes decisions was faced with the question of whether the city of Chicago,
in cases in which it was a postpetition creditor of the debtor, could exercise its
ordinary remedies of towing and impounding a city resident’s vehicle based on
unpaid traffic fines.180 The Seventh Circuit found that the City should, in future
cases, be free do to so because the chapter 13 estate should not extend to include
the debtor’s property post-confirmation.181 Securing exactly this kind of
protection, though, is central to many defenses of preservation of the estate; it is
for that reason, in jurisdictions where the debtor may choose what theory of the
estate to adopt, that debtors are routinely advised to keep property within the
estate—a recommendation that has been echoed by one prominent former
bankruptcy judge in his leading treatise on chapter 13.182
5. A Defense of Estate Termination
A defense of estate termination may proceed along two lines. First, even
conceding that the broader policy goal animating this recommendation, of
enhancing the success rate of chapter 13 or other debt adjustment bankruptcy
cases, is a worthy one, preserving the estate is likely not as effective in securing
that goal as many of its defenders suppose. The protection is at root more a
procedural than a substantive one. There are likely to be other, better ways of
promoting success in debt adjustment bankruptcy. Second, even that limited
180
181
182

See Steenes I, 918 F.3d 554, 556–57 (7th Cir. 2019); Steenes II, 942 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2019).
Steenes I, 918 F.3d at 558.
Former Judge Lundin noted:
The debtor is best positioned to defend the problems created by § 1327(b) by always including
in the plan a provision continuing the estate and overcoming the vesting effect of § 1327(b) until
completion of payments under the plan. Coupled with the expanded definition of estate property
in § 1306, this puts the debtor in the strongest position to argue that the stay continues to protect
all property and income after confirmation.

Keith M. Lundin, LUNDIN ON CHAPTER 13 § 113.11, at ¶ 3 (2020).
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protection, absent the exceptional facts that I describe in Section II.B.2 below,
seems inconsistent with the logic and structure of debt adjustment bankruptcy
law.
a. Stay Relief and Administrative Expenses
As to the first point, the protection against postpetition creditors provided by
sheltering assets within the estate is not absolute. Unpaid postpetition creditors
may seek a remedy from the bankruptcy court. Most clearly, those creditors have
the right to seek relief from the automatic stay, which will free the creditor to
take any actions that would be permissible under state law, just as if the estate
had terminated at plan confirmation.183 Stay relief may be granted for cause—a
standard which is likely met in a case in which a debtor is using estate property
in a way that generates obligations to postpetition creditors that she is not
meeting.184 Perhaps more controversially, the Seventh Circuit ruled in Steenes
II that unpaid postpetition creditors may, at least in some circumstances, be
entitled to an administrative expense, affording them the right not just to be paid
in the bankruptcy case, but to receive priority treatment as against the debtor’s
prepetition general unsecured creditors.185
Here is how the administrative expense theory works. The Code entitles
creditors who meet the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate to receive a priority claim for reimbursement.186 In a debt adjustment
bankruptcy, such a priority claim is typically paid from the debtor’s regular plan
payments, diminishing the funds available to pay prepetition creditors.
Administrative expenses must be paid in full before the debtor may be deemed
to have completed the plan and receive a discharge.187 In a traditional chapter 11
case, it has long been recognized that involuntary creditors of the bankruptcy
estate are entitled to such administrative expenses.188 Without this rule of
183

11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
Relief from the automatic stay, therefore, was the alternative remedy for postpetition creditors
highlighted by the lower courts and by the chapter 13 trustee in the Steenes litigation as a better alternative to
prohibiting debtors from preserving property within the estate or granting administrative expenses. City of
Chicago v. Marshall, 281 F. Supp. 3d 702, 705 (N.D. Ill. 2017), rev’d by Steenes II, 942 F.3d 834 (7th Cir.
2019); Response Brief of Trustee-Appellee Marilyn O. Marshall at 20–23, Steenes I, No. 17-3630 (7th Cir. May
14, 2018). In cases in which the debtor has resorted to the protections of the automatic stay in bad faith, both the
District Court and the trustee in Steenes suggested that the case might be dismissed entirely. Id.
185
Steenes II, 942 F.3d at 839 (7th Cir. 2019).
186
11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(A), 507(b).
187
Id. § 1322(a)(2). Section 1328(b) allows for a hardship discharge where the debtor is unable to
complete a plan “due to circumstances for which [she] should not justly be held accountable” and she has already
paid to unsecured creditors at least as much as they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation. Id. § 1328(b).
188
See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1968); Steenes II, 942 F.3d at 836.
184
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traditional chapter 11, a debtor with a pending bankruptcy case that pollutes its
surrounding neighborhood might resort to bankruptcy to avoid or defer liability
for clean-up costs.189 Tort creditors and other similar postpetition creditors of
the estate would be turned into involuntary financiers of the bankruptcy case as
the debtor used the bankruptcy to avoid meeting its obligations to them while
resolving its liabilities to prepetition creditors. Intermittently, the same
reasoning has been applied to chapter 13.190 The logic of this analysis is hard to
deny. If—and only if—a debtor’s property remains within the bankruptcy estate,
then the costs of maintaining that property become costs of preserving the
bankruptcy estate. When such costs are necessary or are involuntarily imposed
upon creditors—such as the unpaid traffic tickets in Steenes II—there is a fair
argument that they should qualify as administrative expenses.
Exactly how persuasive this conclusion may be is not the focus of this
Article. It is not essential that the Steenes II administrative expense ruling hold
true to conclude that the potential protection of the expanded estate is qualified
because creditors will always have the right to seek relief from stay. And there
are perhaps textual reasons—and certainly policy reasons—to be wary of the
administrative expense analysis. On a textual level, allowing postpetition
creditors administrative expenses in chapter 13 cases (even if not in other forms
of debt adjustment bankruptcy) sits uneasily with section 1305, which provides
a less favorable mechanism by which some postpetition creditors may seek to
participate in the bankruptcy case.191 On a policy level, granting an
administrative expense is a significantly more heavy-handed remedy than
granting relief from stay. It does the very opposite of what this Article argues
should be the norm in the post-confirmation world—it expands, rather than
minimizes, the footprint of the bankruptcy court because the court becomes
responsible for ensuring that the debtor’s postpetition creditors are paid.
Moreover, while estate termination refuses to allow the debtor ordinarily to use
the bankruptcy case as a shield against postpetition creditors, it does not actually
take sides in those disputes over payment between the debtor and creditors.192 It
189
In Reading, an employee of the debtor started a fire that damaged a neighboring property. Reading Co.,
391 U.S. at 473.
190
Compare Steenes II, 942 F.3d at 837–39 (concluding that Reading controls in chapter 13 just as in
chapter 11), with In re Haynes, 569 B.R. 733, 739 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017) overruled by Steenes II, 942 F.3d 834
(7th Cir. 2019) (rejecting the administrative expense argument arguing that Chicago “does not cite one opinion
that applies Reading v. Brown in a Chapter 13 case.”).
191
But see Steenes II, 942 F.3d at 838. The best rejoinder to this argument may be that Congress did not
anticipate that postpetition creditors would routinely hold administrative expense claims precisely because it did
not anticipate that the estate would routinely outlast plan confirmation.
192
The exception to this principle is when a postpetition creditor chooses to participate in the bankruptcy
case pursuant to section 1305 of the Code, in which case it accepts payment on the same terms as other general
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leaves all such disputes, and the legality of any actions creditors might take in
connection therewith, to state law and ordinary non-bankruptcy processes.
Allowing postpetition creditors administrative expense claims instead puts
bankruptcy’s thumb on the scales in favor of the postpetition creditor.
For purposes of this Article’s analysis, the key insight is simply that the
decision to keep property within the estate to protect against postpetition
creditors is far from a sure one. Although my preference in cases in which
property has been preserved within the estate and a postpetition creditor has gone
unpaid would be to grant relief from stay rather than allow an administrative
claim, the debtor is subject to attack along either pathway. Thus, the real effect
of preserving property within the estate is a procedural rather than a substantive
one. What the debtor really gains is an opportunity to have the validity of the
postpetition creditor’s claim tested in the bankruptcy court before any money or
property is transferred to that creditor. As discussed below in Section III.B.2,
there are some cases where this additional procedural hurdle may be justified.
But in many cases, it is likely inconsistent with the structure of debt adjustment
bankruptcy law.
b. The Place of Postpetition Expenses in Bankruptcy
The basic assumption of debt adjustment bankruptcy is that debtors can
afford to pay current expenses as they come due. Debt adjustment bankruptcy
commits only disposable income to the plan—what the debtor has left to repay
creditors with after subtracting allowable expenses from income. A debtor who
cannot afford to pay current expenses is not a good candidate for debt adjustment
bankruptcy. Indeed, bankruptcy will necessarily fail to rehabilitate such a debtor
financially, as new unpaid debts mount up even as old debts are paid under the
plan. It is true that many debtors may face unexpected new expenses some way
into a debt adjustment bankruptcy case. This problem is most keenly identifiable
in chapter 13; commentators investigating the low success rate of chapter 13
plans have found that many chapter 13 cases fail for precisely this reason.193 It
is plausible that allowing the debtor to defer paying postpetition creditors might
allow them more space to keep making plan payments and thus complete their
cases. But this is inequitable to postpetition creditors who are by default
excluded from the plan. And because, as discussed in the preceding Section, the
key effect of preserving the estate is to erect a procedural hurdle rather than a

unsecured creditors and, in exchange for this immediate partial payment, at least runs the risk that the unpaid
balance of its claims will be discharged. See Keith M. Lundin, LUNDIN ON CHAPTER 13 § 158.6, at ¶ 2 (2020).
193
See Greene, Patel & Porter, supra note 2, at 1063–64.
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substantive barrier in front of postpetition creditors, the greatest impact of estate
preservation may be to discourage postpetition creditors from pursuing debts
that are too small to justify the additional costs of enforcement.194
There are likely better ways to respond to this important problem. One
possibility is to permit liberal modification of chapter 13 plans by debtors,
allowing the debtor to reduce their monthly payment to prepetition creditors
when faced with some new financial shock.195 Concomitantly, reducing the
trustee or creditor’s ability to seek modification to increase plan payments may
allow the debtor to build up additional financial resources.196 Some bankruptcy
courts, when calculating a debtor’s monthly disposable income, recognize as one
of the permissible expenses that chapter 13 debtors may deduct from their gross
income a regular contribution to an emergency savings fund;197 recent reform
proposals have suggested standardizing that practice.198 Under chapters 13 and
12, the bankruptcy court may approve a “hardship discharge” for debtors whose
failure to complete the plan is due “to circumstances for which the debtor should
not justly be held accountable. . . .”199 As a result, bankruptcy courts should
consider more frequently resorting to this rarely deployed safety valve.200
B. The Life of the Bankruptcy Estate in Chapter 12 and Small Business Cases
The estate termination theory also holds in chapter 12 and subchapter V.
First, in chapter 12, the language of the statute is identical in all respects. Section
1227 of the Code, like section 1327, vests all property of the estate in the debtor
at plan confirmation.201 There is no reason to believe that vesting property of the
estate means anything different in chapter 12 than in chapter 13—or the
traditional understanding of chapter 11 which, in turn, informs the estate

194
In oral argument in Steenes I, Judge Easterbrook suggested that one potential consequence of
preserving the estate would be to make after-the-fact collection of de minimis expenses relating to operating a
vehicle—such as a toll that is not paid at the time a car is driven on a toll road—practically uncollectable so long
as the vehicle remains in a chapter 13 bankruptcy estate. Oral Argument at 32:33–34:59, Steenes I, 918 F.3d 554
(7th Cir. Sept. 12, 2018) (No. 17-3630), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/oralArguments/oar.jsp?caseyear=17&
casenumber=3630&listCase=List+case%28s%29.
195
See 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (2019).
196
Indeed, subchapter V does precisely this for small business debtors; only the debtor, and not the trustee
or creditors, may propose modifications to a confirmed plan. Id. § 1193(b).
197
AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ABI COMMISSION ON CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 173 (2019).
198
Id. at 171–72.
199
11 U.S.C. § 1328(b). The debtor must already have paid creditors at least as much as they would have
received in a liquidation, and the bankruptcy court must also make a finding that the debtor’s problems cannot
be resolved by modification of the plan. Id.; see id. § 1228(b).
200
See Lawrence Ponoroff, Rethinking Chapter 13, 69 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2017).
201
11 U.S.C. § 1227(b).
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termination theory in chapter 13. For that reason, the few courts that have
considered the lifespan of the bankruptcy estate specifically within the context
of chapter 12 have stressed the influence of chapter 13 on their analysis.202
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that “because chapter 12 was modeled
on chapter 13, and because so many of the provisions are identical, chapter 13
cases construing provisions corresponding to chapter 12 provisions may be
relied on as authority in chapter 12 cases.”203 Whatever conclusion is reached
regarding the lifespan of the bankruptcy estate in chapter 13, it must hold for
chapter 12 also.
Only in subchapter V are there any difficulties in reaching this conclusion.
This is perhaps counterintuitive. The notion that property of the chapter 13 or 12
estate vests in the debtor upon confirmation, terminating the estate, is informed
by the understanding of traditional chapter 11. Exactly the same statutory
provision that prescribes vesting of the estate in the debtor in traditional chapter
11 cases applies in subchapter V.204 At first glance, this same result should hold:
for subchapter V cases, the bankruptcy estate will terminate at plan
confirmation.
Section 1186 of subchapter V, however, obstructs this conclusion. In large
part, this section tracks the sections of chapter 12 and 13 that explain that
property of the estate comprises not just property that the debtor owns as of the
bankruptcy filing, but also property acquired afterwards.205 I have explained why
the broad language of these sections does not justify the conclusion that the
estate nevertheless remains in existence after confirmation of the plan.206 Section
1186 adds an additional gloss to this language; it provides that “[i]f a plan is
confirmed under section 1191(b) of this title,” property of the estate shall include
property acquired after the commencement of the case.207 Because the extensive
words regarding the scope of the bankruptcy estate are said to apply only “if a
plan is confirmed,” the most natural reading of the text appears to be that the
expansive subchapter V estate must exist after confirmation—indeed, that it only

202
See, e.g., In re Knudsen, 356 B.R. 480, 490 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006) (adopting the estate preservation
theory in chapter 12, citing chapter 13 cases); In re LaRosa Greenhouse, LLP, 565 B.R. 304, 311–12 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 2017) (same); In re Smith, 514 B.R. 464, 468–72 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (adopting a hybrid view of
the estate, citing chapter 13 cases); In re Daugherty, 117 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (adopting estate
termination, discussing chapters 12 and 13 together).
203
Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 516 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
204
11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the
confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor.”).
205
Id. §§ 1306, 1207.
206
See supra Section II.A.1.
207
11 U.S.C. § 1186(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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exists post-confirmation, rather than from the beginning of the bankruptcy case.
In other words, of the various theories of the lifespan of the bankruptcy estate,
section 1186 of subchapter V seems most compatible with an incomplete theory
of estate preservation. Judge Paul Bonapfel, in one of the few extended
commentaries on SBRA published to date, reaches exactly this conclusion.208
Yet it seems unlikely that this is what Congress intended. The legislative
history of the SBRA is minimal. The relevant section of the House report simply
repeats the statutory language.209 Nothing suggests an intention to resolve a
multi-decade circuit split over this question of statutory interpretation. Even less
plausible is that Congress would resolve this split in a way that tracks no preexisting rule. Section 1186 is different to its counterparts in chapters 12 and 13,
because as drafted, it appears to speak only to the period after confirmation of
the plan. No pre-existing theory of the estate in debt adjustment bankruptcies
has argued that the expanded estate comes into being only following plan
confirmation. It seems unlikely that Congress intended to create a new and
different working model of the debt adjustment bankruptcy estate. What is more
probable is that Congress intended simply to duplicate the law as it exists under
chapters 12 and 13. In that case, the statement that the expanded estate applies
“if a plan is confirmed” reflects the fact that small business debtors have a choice
how to proceed within chapter 11. Small business debtors may elect to proceed
under the rules for traditional chapter 11, confirming a plan that is subject to all
the usual requirements for a corporate reorganization, or they may choose the
more streamlined procedures created by subchapter V. Congress’s likely
intention, therefore, was to implement a separation among small business
debtors, segregating those proceeding under the new subchapter V provisions
from those proceeding under traditional chapter 11. I believe Congress sought
to subject the former, but not the latter, to the same expanded bankruptcy estate
that is applicable to chapter 12 and 13 debtors, without deciding the precise
content of that estate.
It remains unclear how bankruptcy courts should implement section 1186.
Taken literally, there is little to justify the statutory scheme that Judge Bonapfel
describes, in which an expanded estate comes into being only at the moment that
the debtor confirms a plan. That approach gets precisely backward the policy
rationale discussed above: that close supervision of the debtor’s affairs is
justified immediately after the bankruptcy case has begun, and it is unclear what
the debtor’s obligations to its creditors will be, but that the debtor should be able
208
209

Bonapfel, supra note 26, at 626–27.
H.R. REP. NO. 116-171, at 6 (2019), as reprinted in 2019 WL 3401849.
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to enjoy a fresh start once its plan is confirmed and has embarked upon
repayments. And in contemplating that property will move into the estate while
the case is ongoing, this approach imports the most serious problem that affects
the estate reconciliation theory; it may be difficult for the debtor to know exactly
what property it has the right to deal with freely at any given time.
Indeed, the policy arguments against preservation of the estate postconfirmation are even stronger for business debtors than for consumer debtors
under chapter 13. Depending upon a debtor’s business model, a requirement that
a business debtor appears in court to seek permission before making any other
than ordinary sale or purchase, or other use of estate property, may prove
burdensome. A business may acquire or dispose of assets with substantial
value—such as equipment or real property—with greater frequency than a
consumer. In some chapter 12 cases, debtors have been required to litigate
pursuant to section 363(b) whether they may sell land or other property postconfirmation.210 Since the section 363 standard is typically deferential to a
debtor’s business judgment, requiring litigation over such decisions hardly
seems like an efficient use of resources. In similar fashion, because the Code
regulates the payment of attorneys’ fees out of the bankruptcy estate, a small
business debtor who becomes involved in litigation during its bankruptcy case
on a matter entirely separate from the conduct of the bankruptcy may
nonetheless be required to submit its attorneys’ fees to the bankruptcy court for
approval.211 Nor is it a convincing argument that a business should enjoy
enhanced protection from its postpetition creditors. I have argued that the Code
should not shelter a consumer from a postpetition creditor that she cannot afford
to pay in order to give her a chance to pay prepetition creditors and earn a
discharge.212 But there is certainly a plausible equity-based argument for
assisting consumers in securing a fresh start in this way. A business, in contrast,
should not be able to seek the aid of the bankruptcy courts in externalizing its
financial problems upon postpetition creditors.
The better view, therefore, is that section 1186 should not be read to have
committed Congress to any particular theory of the bankruptcy estate in
subchapter V. The estate termination theory should prevail there, as elsewhere,
because it is the theory that best accounts for the structure of debt adjustment
bankruptcies and the policy considerations that underlie them. Bankruptcy
210

See In re McLendon, 506 B.R. 243, 246 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2013).
See In re LaRosa Greenhouse, 565 B.R. 304, 312 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017) (bankruptcy court approval
required for fees for post-confirmation services provided by attorney in chapter 12 case); In re Brandenburger,
145 B.R. 624, 629–30 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (similar).
212
See supra page 6.
211
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courts may be able to reach this outcome by concluding that section 1186 must
still be read together with the Code’s mandate that, unless the plan states
otherwise, confirmation vests property of the estate in the debtor. In a case in
which the plan purports to preserve the estate, then section 1186 will tell the
debtor what property is contained therein. The greatest certainty, though, would
come from clarification from Congress. Perhaps more feasible is an amendment
of section 1186 that does not tip the scales towards any one of the pre-existing
theories of the estate.213 Congress might also choose to resolve the dispute for
all forms of debt adjustment bankruptcy. In either case, subchapter V would be
best served by application of the estate termination theory.
III. EXTENDING THE LIFE OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
The conclusion that the estate termination theory is more persuasive than
other theories of debt adjustment bankruptcy does not fully resolve questions
regarding the fate of the bankruptcy estate upon confirmation of a debt
adjustment plan. Rather, the estate termination theory sets forth a default rule.
The Code contemplates, however, that there will be circumstances when courts
or debtors may depart from the statutory default. Section 1327(b) of the Code
provides that property revests in the debtor “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
the plan or in the order confirming the plan.”214 Section 1322(b)(9) provides that
the plan shall provide for vesting of property of the estate in the debtor or another
entity “on confirmation of the plan or at later time.”215 Chapter 12 and chapter
11 contain largely parallel provisions.216
Notwithstanding the disagreement regarding the default rule those
provisions establish, courts and commentators, with a few exceptions, have
presumed that these provisions grant a largely free choice—whether to debtors,
to bankruptcy courts, or to both—to adopt a different vesting rule, if the default
rule is not to their liking.217 Thus bankruptcy courts routinely confirm plans that

213
Congress might delete the reference to plan confirmation in section 1186, and instead state that the
expanded definition of property of the estate shall apply in any case in which the debtor elects to proceed under
subchapter V. Since an expanded estate, with the closer supervision of the debtor that it brings, is most important
at the beginning of a case, Congress could also require a small business debtor promptly to declare after
commencing the case its intention to proceed either under subchapter V or traditional chapter 11, engaging as
quickly as possible the expanded bankruptcy estate contemplated by section 1186.
214
11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2019).
215
Id. § 1322(b)(9)
216
Id. §§ 1227(b), 1222(b)(1), 1141(d). Subchapter V contains no analog to §1322(b)(9)’s direction that
the plan shall explain in whom property of the estate shall vest.
217
Indeed, Carlson suggests that the text of the Code “specifically invites just this.” Carlson, supra note
9, at 244–46.
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provide that the bankruptcy estate shall not terminate upon confirmation.
Instead, revesting property of the estate is delayed until a later time—typically,
the end of the bankruptcy case. In essence, debtors and bankruptcy courts are
thought to be empowered to adopt an entirely different theory of the estate and
its purposes to suit individual cases.
The better view is that the presumption that all property of the estate revests
upon plan confirmation cannot be so lightly dispensed with. Instead, the default
rule is sticky. Before a plan providing for continuation of the estate may be
approved, the bankruptcy court must find that preserving the estate serves a valid
bankruptcy purpose. Typically, that will require a showing by the debtor that
keeping property in the bankruptcy estate is necessary to the fulfilment of the
plan. The pathbreaking decision suggesting such an approach is the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in In re Heath.218 As previously noted, Heath is somewhat
unclear in its view of the default rule of revesting upon confirmation of a chapter
13 plan.219 The Seventh Circuit’s description of the chapter 13 estate as
“return[ing] so much of that property to the debtor’s control as is not necessary
to the fulfillment of the plan” could be read either to adopt the estate
transformation or the estate termination theories.220 Regardless, Heath did
clearly argue, albeit in brief dicta, that property necessary to the fulfillment of
the plan represented an upper limit on the contents of the estate postconfirmation. Heath suggested that it would be an abuse of the bankruptcy
court’s discretion to confirm a plan or sculpt the terms of a confirmation order
to provide that any additional property remained in the chapter 13 estate.221
The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated its conclusions from Heath in
Steenes I.222 At the time of the Steenes I decision, the form confirmation order
used in every chapter 13 bankruptcy case in the Northern District of Illinois
incorporated a delayed revesting provision even broader than that at issue in
Heath. The Steenes I form confirmation order provided that all of the debtor’s
property should remain in the estate until the conclusion of the bankruptcy
case.223 In essence, the bankruptcy court adopted the estate preservation theory,
not as a matter of statutory interpretation, but instead via local rule superimposed

218

In re Heath, 115 F.3d 521, 522–24 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id.
220
Id. at 524.
221
Id. (“It would presumably be an abuse of discretion for the bankruptcy court to confirm a plan that
retained more of the property in the hands of the trustee than was reasonably necessary to fulfill the plan, though
we need not decide that in this case.”).
222
Steenes I, 918 F.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2019).
223
Id. at 556.
219
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over the Code’s ordinary default rules. The Seventh Circuit characterized this as
a reversal of the Code’s “presumptive[] return[] [of] the estate’s property to the
debtor.”224 But that kind of blanket reversal was illegitimate: “[i]t is hard to see
how the court could justify routinely doing the opposite of what the statute
provides.”225 Although it gave little explanation for the form such an order might
take, or the reasons that might be required to support it, the Seventh Circuit made
clear that “a case-specific order, supported by good case-specific reasons” would
be necessary before property may be retained in the bankruptcy estate postconfirmation.226
This conclusion was subsequently reiterated in In re Cherry.227 In Cherry, it
was the debtor, rather than the bankruptcy court, that sought to include within
the plan a provision preserving the estate.228 Just as in Steenes I, however, the
preservation of the estate was not supported by any explanation or any findings
by the bankruptcy court; rather, the court asserted that it was the debtor’s right
to choose what theory of chapter 13 to implement.229 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed; any time the debtor (or the bankruptcy court) wants to depart from
the default rule, the debtor has to provide adequate reasons to justify this
choice.230 The alternative allowed for the subversion of the ordinary statutory
scheme without appropriate justification.231
The Seventh Circuit has it right. The Seventh Circuit’s approach to plan or
confirmation order provisions that deviate from the default rule of estate
termination and preserve the bankruptcy estate states the correct rule of the
bankruptcy estate in debt adjustment cases—although it requires further
elucidation. This Section will explain that the power to propose a plan provision
that delays revesting of property of the estate belongs to the debtor in a debt
adjustment case, and not to the bankruptcy court. Consistent with bankruptcy
law that is well-established in other contexts, a provision delaying revesting
should be approved only when it serves some valid bankruptcy purpose. The
principle that the broad and general powers of bankruptcy may only be exercised
in service of a valid bankruptcy purpose is deeply rooted; indeed, it has been
commented upon in positive fashion (although not expressly adopted) by the

224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

Id.
Id. at 557.
Id.
In re Cherry, 963 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 2020).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 719.
Id.
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Supreme Court.232 Ordinarily, establishing a valid bankruptcy purpose will
require the debtor to meet the standard set forth in Heath: a showing that
retention of property within the estate is necessary to fulfilment of the plan.
A. The Holder of the Power to Delay Revesting
There is considerable lack of clarity as to whether the power to propose
departures from the default rule of revesting—whatever that default rule is
assumed to be—belongs to the debtor or the bankruptcy court. One hint is found
in chapter 13, which uses highly standardized forms. The new national model
chapter 13 plan, effective as of December 2017,233 but only adopted by roughly
a dozen bankruptcy courts, appears on its face to grant that choice to debtors.234
Part 7 of the model plan instructs the debtor to choose from three options:
property of the estate will vest in the debtor upon plan confirmation; property of
the estate will vest upon entry of the discharge; or some other alternative that the
debtor specifies.235 The relevant Committee Note, however, jettisons any clarity
that might be provided by the text of the model plan by stating that the debtor’s
choice “is subject to a contrary court order under Code § 1327(b).”236 Consistent
with that approach, some bankruptcy courts in chapter 13 cases have used form
plans or confirmation orders that make the revesting choice for debtors.237 And
when debtors have attempted to depart from a court’s preferred choice,
232

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017).
U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM 113, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual-debtors/
chapter-13-plan.
234
Bankruptcy courts that have not adopted the national model plan use their own standardized forms.
Daniel Gill, No Thanks: Most Districts Opt Out of National Chapter 13 Plan, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/no-thanks-districts-n73014472651/.
235
See U.S. COURTS, OFFICIAL FORM 113, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual-debtors/
chapter-13-plan.
236
U.S. COURTS, COMMITTEE NOTES ON OFFICIAL FORM 113, Part 7, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/b_113_cn_0.pdf.
237
See, e.g., In re Henneghan, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2553, at *4 n. 1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2009) (“In this district,
this vexing issue [of whether, by default, the estate terminates on confirmation] is largely moot because, since
several years ago, the court’s usual chapter 13 confirmation order routinely postpones vesting under § 1327(b)
until the entry of the discharge order.”); In re Boyd, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1954, at *33 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2020)
(concluding that the Seventh Circuit correctly stated the default rule of estate termination in chapter 13, but that
“[t]his District has opted out of the § 1327(b) and (c) vesting provisions”, and explaining that neighboring
bankruptcy courts in the Western and Middle Districts of North Carolina have done similarly); U.S. COURTS,
LBF-M CHAPTER 13 PLAN, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland ¶ 8, available at
https://www.mdb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/LBF_M_1217_0.pdf, (“Title to the Debtor’s property shall
revest in the Debtor when the Debtor is granted a discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328 . . .”); U.S. COURTS,
FORM BTXN222 – CHAPTER 13 PLAN, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas at p. 11
(effective July 1, 2017), available at https://www.txnb.uscourts.gov/forms/btxn222-chapter-13-plan-new-formeffective-712017 (“Property of the estate shall not vest in the Debtor until such time as a discharge is granted or
the Case is dismissed or closed without discharge.”).
233
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bankruptcy judges have not been slow to rein the debtor in. One bankruptcy
court, therefore, observed that:
the Bankruptcy Code provides [debtors] with no absolute right to
vesting of property prior to discharge, and, if the Court orders
otherwise, property of the estate does not vest in them upon
confirmation. In the instant case, the Court ordered otherwise,
consistent with practice in this jurisdiction for the past five years. The
orders of confirmation were not inconsistent with their right to propose
plan provisions, including vesting. The Court, however, is not required
to confirm a plan which calls for vesting under the provisions of
§ 1327(b), particularly in view of the First Circuit’s decision in
Barbosa v. Solomon.238

Another bankruptcy court, relying on section 1327(b)’s provision, concluded
that the Code “clearly reserves in the bankruptcy court the power to determine
when property of the estate shall vest in the debtor, so the latter half of § 1327(b)
works as a gap-filler for when the confirmation order or the plan does not treat
this issue.”239
It is hard to justify replacing the default rule of estate termination with their
own different and preferred approach to revesting property of the estate, as some
bankruptcy courts have.240 To the extent that the Code provides any discretion
to depart from that presumption of revesting, that discretion must belong to the
debtor, not the bankruptcy court. Courts that make that decision for all debtors
that come before them are making an essentially legislative judgment. In effect,
chapter 13 is transmuted into a dramatically different statute on a district-bydistrict basis. It is certainly true that divergent local practices have been a
persistent feature of the law of chapter 13 for many years.241 But differences in
varying mechanics of chapter 13—such as whether chapter 13 plans are funded
by direct payments of the debtor or via wage garnishment orders,242 or whether
routine confirmation hearings are presided over by the bankruptcy judge or the

238
In re Smith, 334 B.R. 26, 39 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). Barbosa adopted the estate reconciliation
approach, but noted as to the debtor’s prepetition property that “in spite of the ‘vesting’ provided by section
1327 of the Code, until all payments due under the plan are made, both the trustee and the unsecured creditors
have an interest in the preservation of the debtor’s financial situation.” Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 36–
37 (1st Cir. 2000).
239
In re Moore, 312 B.R. 902, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004).
240
See In re Boyd, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1954, at *35.
241
See Greene, Patel & Porter, supra note 2, at 1034–35 (describing scholarship on “local legal culture”
and chapter 13, beginning with the 1994 article from Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook) (citing to Teresa
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence
from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801 (1994)).
242
See Greene, Patel & Porter, supra note 2, at 1036.
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chapter 13 trustee243—should not provide a basis for varying basic structural
principles of bankruptcy law. Nor, as debt adjustment bankruptcies are made
available to new classes of debtors, is there reason to conclude that Congress
intended such fundamental differences based solely on the debtor’s location.
Even setting aside such structural concerns, I do not believe that bankruptcy
courts should make the revesting choice for debtors. At root, those courts who
do deviate from the norms of traditional chapter 11 do so for paternalistic
reasons. Yet a debtor who commences a bankruptcy case should never be in
doubt about whether he will recover full rights to all his property once he has
struck his bargain with prepetition creditors, and thus has secured court approval
for a plan. As Section II explains, adopting any different revesting rule may
seriously constrains the debtor’s ability to deal with his own property; regardless
of how diligent he is in making his plan payments, he may still be precluded
from buying a car, selling investment property, or even taking a vacation,
without first securing trustee or court approval. The Seventh Circuit in Heath
may have overstated the case in observing that the five-year guardianship
effected by preserving the entire bankruptcy estate would reduce “[t]he legal
situation of the debtor … to that of a child, a mental incompetent, or a married
woman in the era of coverture.”244 But bankruptcy courts are nonetheless well
aware that some debtors chafe at restrictions imposed upon their management of
their own post-confirmation affairs.245 The highly paternalistic view of courts
that impose estate preservation upon chapter 13 debtors against their wishes
implies that courts must be “gatekeepers” of chapter 13 debtors’ affairs. This is
unlikely to promote successful reorganizations in chapter 13. Chapter 13 is, after
all, entirely voluntary, and over-intrusive management of individual debtors’
lives may simply prompt the debtor to dismiss their bankruptcy case.246 Any
discretion provided to the bankruptcy court should not include the ability to
impose such constraints upon a debtor against his wishes.247

243
Professor Melissa Jacoby has described this practice of some courts in past work. Melissa Jacoby,
Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankruptcy Courts, 87 TEMPLE L. REV. 875, 887–89 (2015).
244
In re Heath, 115 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 1997).
245
See In re Ward, 546 B.R. 667, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016) (ordering debtor to return vehicle she had
purchased post-confirmation with post-confirming earnings and observing that “this court believes that the
Chapter 13 trustee and court are required to be gatekeepers on post-confirmation activities, to some extent, such
as a Chapter 13 debtor’s desire to purchase a car during her case.”).
246
Thus, in the Ward bankruptcy, the court expected that the debtor would voluntarily dismiss her
bankruptcy case in light of the court’s ruling that the debtor was required to return a vehicle purchased with
property of the estate. Id. at 681. Apparently viewing that outcome as unsatisfactory, the bankruptcy court
ordered that, should the debtor do so, she would be subject to a 180-day bar before the case could be refiled. Id.
247
Carlson similarly concludes that “the confirmation order must achieve what the debtor legitimately
wants, free of coercion by the court or trustee.” Carlson, supra note 9, at 246.
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The argument against forcing a delay in revesting upon a debtor is even
stronger in business cases outside the context of chapter 13. Requiring debtors
frequently to resort to the bankruptcy court may impose costs that the debtor is
not well placed to bear.248 Each interaction with the bankruptcy court will cost
both time, as it waits for court approval, and money, as it pays for attorneys to
represent it before the court. The case for paternalistic oversight of its affairs is
also weaker than with a consumer debtor. Small businesses are already subject
to extensive regulatory oversight which does not need to be supplemented by
long-term bankruptcy court scrutiny. Moreover, to the extent that a bankruptcy
court believes a business’s prospects to be so poor that it cannot survive unless
its affairs are overseen by the court in this way, it is likely that the business is a
poor candidate for reorganization in the first place. Rather than confirming a
plan that holds the business’s assets in the estate, the bankruptcy court should
consider whether business’s assets would be put to better use if they were
transferred or sold and a new manager allowed to take over.249
B. The Scope of the Power to Delay Revesting
Any discretion created by the Code to delay revesting of property of the
estate, properly understood, belongs to debtors, not judges. Next at issue is the
extent of that discretion: Is it an unqualified discretion that permits the debtor to
choose, in each individual case, the revesting rule that suits him best? Or may
the default presumptive rule that property of the estate revests in the debtor upon
plan confirmation be disturbed only under more limited circumstances?
1. Valid Bankruptcy Purpose
The discretion of the debtor must be limited. A debt adjustment plan may
not retain property within the estate unless doing so serves some appropriate
purpose consistent with the goals of bankruptcy. The notion that broad and
general discretionary powers contained with the Code may be exercised only for
an appropriate purpose is long rooted.250 The bankruptcy process affords debtors
248
See In re McLendon, 506 B.R. 243 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2013); In re LaRosa Greenhouse, 565 B.R. 304,
311 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017) (bankruptcy court approval required for fees for post-confirmation services provided
by attorney in chapter 12 case); In re Brandenburger, 145 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (similar).
249
The bankruptcy court should confirm a plan only if it is feasible—that is, it does not believe the plan
will likely be followed by liquidation or a later reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2019).
250
Nor is the principle that discretion conferred by the text of a statute comes with constraints and may be
exercised only for appropriate purposes limited to bankruptcy. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 89
n. 1, 95 (1989) (for statutes stating that court “may” allow attorneys’ fees, “that discretion is not without limit”
and fees ordinarily “should” be allowed to a prevailing party to give effect to the purposes behind the statute);
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1993) (FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), allowing for plain error review of
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a great deal of flexibility, including the ability to craft plans or other schema
incorporating a wide range of provisions crafted to suit a debtor’s individual
circumstances. Rather than conclude that discretion-conferring provisions allow
the debtor unconstrained freedom to reorder their affairs, courts conclude that
the Code’s provisions may only be used in a manner consistent with the broader
statutory scheme and that reflect a valid bankruptcy purpose. Most prominently,
this principle was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Jevic.251 The
issue in Jevic was whether distributions to creditors on account of their
prepetition claims deviated from the ordinary scheme of priorities applicable to
a chapter 11 plan.252 The Supreme Court tacitly approved some categories of
such distributions—such as orders entered early in chapter 11 cases that permit
the debtor to pay the prepetition wage claims of its employees, or claims of
prepetition vendors whose continued business is vital to the company—on the
theory that such distributions serve “significant Code-related objectives.”253 The
priority-violating distributions at issue in Jevic, however, were impermissible
because they did not serve a proper bankruptcy purpose.254
Lower court decisions have set forth similar principles. The Seventh
Circuit’s decision in In re Sadler—a decision cited approvingly by the Supreme
Court in Jevic—interpreted the scope of the flexibility conferred upon debtors
by section 349, the provision governing the effect of a dismissal of a bankruptcy
case. 255 The debtors in Sadler, who ran a family farm, defaulted on a loan,
causing a creditor to file suit and obtain a prejudgment attachment against their
crops.256 The debtors subsequently filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case; during
a criminal judgment, “is permissive not mandatory” but exercise of discretion must be “guide[d]” and errors
“should” be corrected if they seriously affect the fairness of a proceeding); Price v. Pelka, 690 F.3d 98, 101
(“The language of section 1988 is permissive, therefore, an award of attorneys’ fees is discretionary. . . .
Although the language of section 1977 is permissive, the court must exercise its discretion consistent with the
congressional purpose underlying the statute.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bur. Fed., Inc., 996 F.2d 774,
778 (5th Cir. 1993) (discretion to decide whether or not to dismiss a declaratory judgment action is “broad [but]
not unfettered” and may not be exercised “on the basis of whim or personal disinclination” but must instead
“address[] and balance[] the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the factors relevant to the abstention
doctrine”); Serco Servs. Co. v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (similar); Speed v. JMA Energy
Co., 872 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding that the district court’s discretion pursuant to Class Action
Fairness Act to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action is not unfettered but must be guided by
statutory factors).
251
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
252
Id. at 978.
253
Id. at 985.
254
Id. at 985–86 (violation of priority rules lacked “any significant offsetting bankruptcy-related
justification”).
255
In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 918–21 (1991); Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (quoting In re Sadler, 935 F.2d at
918–21).
256
In re Sadler, 935 F.2d at 919.
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that case, the bankruptcy court entered an order avoiding the prejudgment
lien.257 After the Sadler’s bankruptcy case had been proceeding for some
months, chapter 12 of the Code, which was specifically designed to promote the
reorganization of family farms, went into effect.258 The Sadlers believed they
would be better off in chapter 12, but the Code––as it existed at that time––
prohibited conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 12.259 Instead the Sadlers
dismissed their chapter 13 case and filed a new chapter 12 bankruptcy case.
Concurrently, they successfully moved the bankruptcy court to enter an order
keeping in effect the avoidance of the lien, even though dismissal would
normally unwind such avoidance actions.260 To be sure, the Code expressly
contemplates flexibility in such circumstances: the ordinary effects of dismissal,
including the vacatur of orders avoiding liens, may be modified “for cause.”261
But “‘[c]ause’ under § 349(b) means an acceptable reason. Desire to make an
end run around a statute is not an adequate reason.”262 In short, the flexibility
inherent in the Code may be exercised only to serve an appropriate purpose.
Nor, in this case, does the requirement for a valid bankruptcy purpose lack
support from the text of the Code. Each form of debt adjustment bankruptcy
provides a textual hook for this requirement in mandating that a plan must be
proposed in good faith.263 It has been established in chapter 11 that the good
faith standard requires the showing of a valid bankruptcy purpose. Any chapter
11 case, for example, is subject to dismissal if not filed in good faith.264 Again,
leading decisions interpreting that requirement make clear that the core of that
inquiry is whether the bankruptcy petition serves a valid bankruptcy purpose.265
And chapter 11’s parallel to section 1325(a)(3), section 1129(a)(3) (which
governs both traditional chapter 11 plans and debt adjustment plans under
subchapter V), has similarly been held to require that a proposed chapter 11 plan
“will fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the

257

Id.
Id.
259
Id. at 920.
260
Id. at 919.
261
11 U.S.C. § 349(b) (2019).
262
In re Sadler, 935 F.3d at 921.
263
11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(3), 1225(a)(3), 1129(a)(3).
264
In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 159–62 (3d Cir. 1999).
265
Id. at 165–66 (lack of good faith where “absence of a valid reorganizational purpose”); see In re 15375
Memorial Corp., 589 F.3d 605, 618–19 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of petitions because “Debtors were
not seeking Chapter 11 protection of a valid bankruptcy purpose, but instead were using the filings as a litigation
tactic”); see also Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 1989) (“overall aim” of good faith inquiry
must be “to determine whether the purposes of the Code would be furthered by permitting the Chapter 11
petitioner to proceed”).
258
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Bankruptcy Code.”266 Courts will thus decline to confirm chapter 11 plans that
contain provisions not appropriately directed toward a valid bankruptcy
purpose.267
In addition to finding both deep roots in bankruptcy jurisprudence and an
appropriate textual hook, there are good policy reasons for identifying a valid
bankruptcy purpose requirement before property may be retained within the
estate post-confirmation. The Code unambiguously provides for close
supervision and protection of property of the estate in the pre-confirmation
world.268 Until the debtor confirms a debt adjustment plan, his assets are
preserved within the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of creditors. The automatic
stay serves to protect those assets, and bankruptcy court and trustee supervision
prevents the debtor from dissipating them.269 Meanwhile, disputes regarding
those assets are funneled into the bankruptcy court for resolution. Once the
debtor has confirmed a plan, a bargain has been struck with creditors.270 Thus,
in the post-confirmation world, bankruptcy court control over all of the debtor’s
assets is not required. The debtor’s obligations to prepetition creditors extend
only to meeting his obligations under the plan. The bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction, in turn, is appropriately limited to supervising and enforcing the
terms of the plan.271
To follow the principle of cases like Jevic and Sadler, the bankruptcy court
must come up with some other valid bankruptcy purpose before it may conclude
that property may be preserved within the bankruptcy estate. And it appears,
given the limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, that no such valid

266
In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 247 (3d Cir. 2004); see In re Vill. at Camp Bowie I, L.P.,
710 F.3d 239, 247 (5th Cir. 2013) (good faith requirement met where plan “proposed with the legitimate and
honest purpose to reorganize”).
267
See, e.g., In re GAC Storage Lansing, LLC, 465 B.R. 174, 201–02 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013) (plan’s
improper purpose to secure injunction protecting non-debtor guarantor rather than maximize debtor’s value
meant not proposed in good faith); In re Noll, 172 B.R. 122, 124 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (plan not proposed in
good faith based on inclusion of economically unjustifiable release of debtor’s claims against creditor); In re
UVAS Farming Corp., 91 B.R. 579, 581 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988).
268
See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2019).
269
Id. §§ 362, 363.
270
See In re Murphy, 474 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A confirmed Chapter 13 plan is ‘a new and
binding contract, sanctioned by the court, between the debtors and their pre-confirmation creditor[s].’”) (quoting
In re Penrod, 169 B.R. 910, 916 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.1994)); In re Harvey, 213 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2000); In
re Oparaji, 698 F.3d 231, 238 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding a chapter 13 plan is an “exchanged for bargain between
the debtor and the debtor’s creditors”); In re Forte, 341 B.R. 859, 869–70 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (discussing
“contract between a debtor and creditors formed by confirmation of the chapter 13 plan.”).
271
In re Craig’s Stores of Tex., Inc., 266 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding in chapter 11 case that
“[a]fter a debtor’s reorganization plan has been confirmed, the debtor’s estate, and thus bankruptcy jurisdiction,
ceases to exist, other than for matters pertaining to the implementation or execution of the plan.”).
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bankruptcy purpose is served by delaying the revesting of all estate property
until the conclusion of the bankruptcy estate. Rather, the effects of such a delay
in revesting are inconsistent with the proper working of bankruptcy law. On the
one hand, as we have seen, delaying revesting vitiates the fresh start that the
debtor would otherwise obtain upon plan confirmation by continuing to subject
all of the debtor’s financial affairs to bankruptcy court supervision until the
completion of the debtor’s plan payments. On the other hand, delaying the
revesting of all property of the estate contravenes the Code by providing a debtor
with unwarranted protection from postpetition creditors. When the revesting of
property of the estate is delayed, that property continues to be subject to the
automatic stay as provided for by section 362(a)(3) of the Code, prohibiting acts
to exercise control over property of the estate. Indeed, debtors in chapter 13
cases have been recommended to delay revesting to engage this protection.272
The Steenes and Cherry litigation concerned precisely this: debtors who sought
to delay revesting of property of the estate to protect the city of Chicago from
enforcing postpetition traffic penalties by towing the debtors’ cars.273
Expanding the automatic stay in this manner is inconsistent with the
structure of the Code. Although the Code carefully regulates the relationship
between a debtor and his prepetition creditors throughout the bankruptcy case,
it does not seek to protect debtors from their postpetition creditors. The
272

See supra notes 178–180, 220–229 and accompanying text.
Steenes I, 918 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 2019); In re Cherry, 963 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2020). Chicago’s
practices in enforcing its traffic enforcement laws have been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Melissa Sanchez &
Sandhya Kambhampati, How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists into Bankruptcy, PRO PUBLICA (Feb.
27, 2018), https://features.propublica.org/driven-into-debt/chicago-ticket-debt-bankruptcy/. I do not write this
Article to defend the City’s choices in enforcing its traffic laws; indeed, Chicago itself has recognized that many
of its historic practices require reform. See generally Driven into Debt: How Tickets Burden the Poor, PRO
PUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/series/driven-into-debt (last accessed Nov. 1, 2020) (collecting articles
describing reforms to Chicago’s traffic laws and policies). Regarding the broader debate over Chicago’s traffic
debt, I make only one point in this Article: that debtors cannot, at least by default, use the automatic stay in a
pending bankruptcy case to shield a car from actions the City wants to take to enforce a ticket issued after the
commencement of the bankruptcy case. There may be special cases in which such protection is justified, but
likely not every case will qualify, and the protection of the stay should not apply as a matter of course. See In re
Heath, 115 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Cherry, 963 F.3d at 719; Steenes I, 918 F.3d at 558. To be sure,
that may harm some individual debtors. As I have explained, my normative view of debt adjustment bankruptcy
assumes that debtors must pay all their ordinary go-forward expenses while they remain in bankruptcy. Supra
notes 191–192 and accompanying text. The moral force of that argument is diminished in cases in which debtors
are subject to unjust debt collection efforts of any type. Thus, to the extent that debtors in Chicago—or
elsewhere—seek relief from unfair or heavy-handed traffic enforcement, chapter 13 may seem like a lifeline that
may save their cars. But using bankruptcy in this way has to be, at a minimum, a second-best solution to reform
or regulation of the underlying debt collection practices. In addition to being legally questionable, for the reasons
I have outlined, it is not clear that debtors actually end up better off; temporarily unenforceable postpetition
traffic fines and penalties will continue to pile up during the bankruptcy case and will likely mean that the debtor
loses her car as soon as the case is over. See Steenes I, 918 F.3d at 558.
273
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automatic stay, for example, enjoins “any act to collect, assess, or recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case,” but
does not enjoin postpetition creditors from taking such actions.274 Nor is the stay
intended to insulate debtors from collection efforts made by postpetition
creditors. Absent special circumstances, postpetition creditors are not provided
for by a debt adjustment plan.275 The debtor is expected to meet his obligations
to postpetition creditors in the ordinary course throughout the period in which
he is making his payments under the plan to repay prepetition creditors. That
also is implicit in the Code’s structure: the debtor commits only his projected
disposable income to the plan (and may modify the plan if his disposable income
changes post-confirmation). Calculation of a debtor’s disposable income takes
account of the debtor’s expected postpetition expenses.276 Preserving property
within the bankruptcy estate, however, prevents postpetition creditors from
actually seeking to collect on their claims and is in contravention to the statutory
scheme.277 Notably, Carlson has criticized theories of chapter 13 that preserve
the chapter 13 estate by default precisely because they serve to expand the
automatic stay and inhibit collection attempts by postpetition creditors.278 For
exactly the same reason, a debtor in a debt adjustment case should not be
permitted to elect to preserve the estate, in an attempt to secure stay protection
at the expense of his postpetition creditors.
There is a further troubling effect to permitting debtors to delay the revesting
of property of the estate until discharge, dismissal, or conversion of the case.
Because the extent of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is largely tied to the
scope of the bankruptcy estate, preserving the estate for the life of the plan vastly
expands bankruptcy court jurisdiction.279 Courts have warned against this
274

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2019).
Section 1305(a)(1) allows tax creditors to file proofs of claim, and thus be paid under the plan, for taxes
that fall due while the case is pending. Id. § 1305(a)(1). Section 1305(a)(2) allows postpetition creditors to file
proofs of claim if they hold consumer debts against the debtor personally for property or services necessary for
the debtor’s performance under the plan. Id. § 1305(a)(2). There is no analog in chapter 12 or subchapter V.
276
Id. §§ 1325(b)(2), 1225(b)(2), 1191(d).
277
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama reached a similar conclusion:
275

If postpetition creditors can reach only debtors individually, but not property and wages that
remain vested in the estate, then these creditors have no meaningful remedy while the case is
pending unless they first obtain relief from the stay to pursue property of the estate before
commencing state law collection remedies. Such a two-step process gives debtors, who leave all
their property in the bankruptcy estate, unwarranted stay protection, and it imposes additional
collection expenses and delays on postpetition creditors.
In re Jemison, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3107, at *7–9 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007).
278
Carlson, supra note 9, at 247–48.
279
Supra pages 15–16 (discussing how bankruptcy court jurisdiction and the scope of the estate are
intertwined).
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outcome in chapter 11. The alternative is to “funnel virtually all litigation
affecting [reorganized debtors] into a single federal forum.”280 A chapter 11
debtor is expected, post-confirmation, to “go about its business without further
supervision or approval. The firm also is without the protection of the
bankruptcy court. It may not come running to the bankruptcy judge every time
something unpleasant happens.”281
There is no reason to treat debtors in debt adjustment cases differently from
those proceeding under traditional chapter 11. It is as untenable for bankruptcy
jurisdiction to extend to all of the debtor’s property post-confirmation in a
chapter 13, chapter 12, or subchapter V case as it is for bankruptcy jurisdiction
to extend to a traditional chapter 11 debtor’s post-confirmation affairs. As Judge
Posner explained in Heath, that would render the bankruptcy court the arbiter of
“the dispute with the corner grocer.”282 One bankruptcy court forcefully rejected
this possibility:
[T]he retention of all property in the estate during the life of a case is
not practical, and . . . would confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court
and entangle it in even the pettiest of controversies and immerse the
court in the day-to-day lives of debtors. For example, do the debtors in
these cases intend for the Court to hear a dispute with the
neighborhood grocer if the debtor is overcharged for an apple?283

Debtors certainly possess a degree of flexibility to shape the postconfirmation estate in a debt adjustment bankruptcy. But flexibility provided by
the Code is not the same thing as license. A debtor’s powers and privileges in
bankruptcy must be exercised in good faith. The meaning of the good faith
requirement—an overarching principle of bankruptcy generally—is that
provisions incorporated in the plan must serve a valid bankruptcy purpose. That
requirement governs provisions purporting to delay revesting of the estate, just
as it does any other provision of the plan. And that requirement will substantially
limit the circumstances in which revesting may be delayed.
2. Necessity to Fulfillment of the Plan
As the Seventh Circuit in Heath proposed, demonstrating a valid bankruptcy
purpose for preserving the estate post-confirmation requires a showing that

280

In re Boston Reg’l Med. Ctr., 410 F.3d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 2005).
Pettibone Corp. v. Easley, 935 F.2d 120, 122 (7th Cir. 1991).
282
In re Heath, 115 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 1997).
283
In re Jemison, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3107, at *20–21 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007) (striking from chapter 13
plan provision that delayed revesting of all property of the estate).
281
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property to be retained within the estate is necessary to the fulfillment of the
plan.284 The plan is the central feature of the post-confirmation world, and the
key source of the debtor’s obligations while the case remains pending. To the
extent the debtor wishes to secure for himself or his property additional
protections beyond those ordinarily afforded by the Code, those protections must
be justified by their effect upon the debtor’s ability to meet his plan obligations.
On this issue, the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Steenes I and Cherry do not
provide helpful guidance. They observe that property may only be preserved
within the estate for a “good, case-specific reason” without suggesting what kind
of justification might suffice.285 Implicit in the decisions seems to be that
invoking the protection of the automatic stay will not count as a good reason for
keeping property in the estate; the opinions describe the plans at issue as
“sheltering scofflaws.”286 But it cannot be that a plan drafted to keep some
property within the estate fails simply because the debtor’s reason for preserving
the estate is to secure the stay’s protection. From the debtor’s perspective,
gaining the benefit of the stay as against postpetition creditors is really the only
substantial benefit of keeping property within the estate. The other chief effect
of preserving the estate is to require the debtor to seek court permission to make
other-than-ordinary dispositions of assets; few debtors are likely to want to
preserve the bankruptcy estate in order to impose that burden upon
themselves.287 If a finding that a debtor sought to secure the stay’s protection
were enough to doom a plan, then the ability for debtors to depart from the
default rule would be read out of the Code entirely. There would be little, if
anything, the debtor could propose that would meet the necessary hurdle.
Courts considering this question must therefore figure out for themselves
what counts as a valid reason to preserve property within the bankruptcy estate.
My suggestion is that the analysis should consider how compelling the debtor’s
reasons are for seeking this kind of special protection and for resorting to the
bankruptcy court as a shield against postpetition creditors. As I discussed in
Section II.A.5 above, the key protection provided by preserving the stay is
procedural, rather than substantive. It affects the timing and forum of litigation
over postpetition creditors’ enforcement actions. In most cases, the debtor
cannot secure absolute protection, because a bankruptcy court may grant unpaid
postpetition creditors relief from the automatic stay or an administrative
284

In re Heath, 115 F.3d at 524.
In re Cherry, 963 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2020).
286
Steenes I, 918 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 2019).
287
See supra pages 14–15 (discussing the role of the bankruptcy court for debtor’s use of property postconfirmation).
285
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expense. Meanwhile, it is not true that the debtor is entirely unprotected even in
the absence of the estate. A debtor always has the right to challenge the validity
of some collection effort in state court; for example, a debtor might sue an auto
lender in state court that repossessed her car, arguing that the lender had
miscalculated the balance due and the debtor had not really defaulted on the
loan. The effect of preserving the estate is to funnel all such disputes into the
bankruptcy court, and to ensure that they are resolved before, rather than after,
postpetition creditors have taken some action to collect on unpaid debts. The
best justification for preserving the stay is likely to come in cases in which this
kind of after-the-fact challenge is insufficient, and it is essential to the debtor
that any collection efforts are scrutinized in advance. In other words, the debtor
should argue that collection efforts are likely to result in the immediate failure
of the plan, such that the justifiability of the postpetition creditor’s actions must
be litigated in advance, rather than challenged after the fact in the ordinary
course.
Precisely when such circumstances exist is likely to be a fact-dependent
question. The standard appears clearly to be met if a plan provides that a specific
piece of property will be liquidated to repay creditors. Once the property is gone,
the debtor’s ability to repay creditors vanishes, and the plan will fail. Before a
postpetition creditor pulls the rug out from underneath the plan in this way, its
claim and rights over the property ought to be subjected to appropriate review
by the bankruptcy court (and the filing of a motion in the bankruptcy court may
additionally prompt the debtor quickly to take steps toward working out this
obligation). Similarly, if the debtor’s ability to complete all plan payments is
predicated on a specific piece of income generating property (such as a house
from which the debtor receives rental income), that asset could be kept in the
estate to ensure that the plan is not disrupted without appropriate cause.
To be sure, there will be some hard calls in implementing this standard.
Debtors who seek broad post-confirmation protection from their postpetition
creditors may argue that many of their key assets are necessary for them to
continue making plan payments. Necessity, of course, is likely to be more clearly
established in some cases than others. In a consumer case, a debtor who earns a
major portion of her income driving a car for a ride-sharing service is likely to
have a compelling argument that they cannot complete the plan without the
vehicle, and thus should be able to justify retaining the vehicle within the
bankruptcy estate. Other debtors may wish for the same protection for their
vehicle simply because they drive it to and from work. The intention of this
Article is not to require bankruptcy courts to hear extended testimony on such
issues, or to make detailed findings of fact regarding, for example, how feasible
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it would be for a debtor who ordinarily drives to work instead to rely on public
transit. Inquiries of this nature would be inconsistent with the “light touch”
model of bankruptcy that I describe below, which seeks to minimize the debtor’s
encounters with the bankruptcy court.288
Rather, I expect that a proposed plan will pass muster if it identifies a specific
asset that is to remain in the estate and recites some reason, compelling on its
face, why the loss of that asset could immediately jeopardize the bankruptcy.
That claim would be supported by a sworn declaration or some other attestation
by the debtor—the kind of minimal evidentiary showing that is already
extremely common in bankruptcy practice. In most cases, creditors are unlikely
to object to these plan provisions and no litigation of any kind will ensure. After
all, extending the stay chiefly impacts the enforceability of debts that do not yet
exist at the time of plan confirmation. In some cases, there will be creditors who
are already present at the time of plan confirmation and thus able to object to a
plan provision keeping an asset within the estate. That may occur when a debtor
has incurred an obligation between the time of filing a bankruptcy case and the
confirmation of a plan, or is a repeat obligor of a specific creditor, such that the
likelihood of some new debt arising during the plan period gives the creditor
standing to object the plan. In these few cases, the creditor may challenge the
debtor’s recited reasons as to why keeping property in the estate is essential and,
if it can supply evidence sufficient to controvert the debtor’s testimony, that
objection may be resolved by the bankruptcy court at the confirmation hearing.
The key advantages of this approach are certainty and predictability. For the
debtor whose property needs the additional protection provided by the automatic
stay, or whose affairs for some reason require greater supervision, the estate may
remain open post-confirmation. But that will be the case only where specific
language in the plan so provides. Because the retention of property within the
estate is not self-executing, as with the estate transformation theory, the plan and
confirmation order may provide guidance to the debtor and creditors as to
precisely what assets are in the estate, and permit all parties to the bankruptcy
case to understand their rights in respect of those assets. The plan will also
articulate the basis for retention of property within the estate. Creditors who have
grounds to challenge the debtor’s decision in that respect will have the
opportunity to raise that challenge at the time of plan confirmation and to force
the debtor to justify his decision to depart from the default rule of revesting.

288

See infra Section IV.
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IV. LIGHT-TOUCH BANKRUPTCY
To conclude, I will attempt to situate my view of the limited lifespan of the
bankruptcy estate in a broader model of debt adjustment bankruptcy that I will
call “light-touch bankruptcy.” Light-touch bankruptcy law seeks to make
bankruptcy cases as minimally burdensome for the debtor as possible. It assumes
that the debtor will undertake the task of managing her own affairs, and thus
seeks to afford her a financial “fresh start” at the earliest possible date. In so
doing, the light-touch bankruptcy approach also attempts to make bankruptcy as
simple and cheap as possible. One likely positive effect of this approach is to
make bankruptcy cases easier to administer—a timely change given the expected
waves of both business and consumer filings expected to follow the COVID-19
pandemic. From the perspective of the debtor, though, light-touch bankruptcy is
very much conscious that debt adjustment bankruptcy exists as an alternative to
a simple, speedy liquidation bankruptcy under chapter 7.289 Debtors may emerge
from chapter 7 proceedings after only a few short weeks or months immediately
able to start a new financial life, freed of any restrictions attend to a bankruptcy
filing, and unprotected by the bankruptcy court (save for the discharge of
prepetition debt).290 Debt adjustment bankruptcies, necessarily, take longer. But
I posit that there is little need for them to be more intrusive for the debtor, or to
presume that the debtor requires greater ongoing scrutiny or shielding from the
bankruptcy court, than chapter 7 does. Light-touch bankruptcy, therefore,
disagrees emphatically with bankruptcy courts that argue that their role is to be
“gatekeepers on post-confirmation activities.”291

289
Some chapter 13 debtors, of course, do not have the option of filing for bankruptcy under chapter 7.
The means test created by Congress’s 2005 bankruptcy reform legislation presumptively requires some abovemedian income debtors, who Congress believes to be most capable of repaying debts over time, to seek relief
under chapter 13 rather than chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2019). I join with the many critics of the means test
who have argued that it has largely failed to achieve what Congress wanted. See John Pottow et al., Did
Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 353 (2008).
Perhaps more significantly, and certainly less justifiably, chapter 7 remains out of reach for many low income
consumers that might benefit most from a speedy liquidation because consumer debtors’ attorneys will typically
require an upfront fee to file a chapter 7 case that is beyond the consumer debtor’s means (while chapter 13 cases
are often filed for no money down). See Pamela Foohey et al., “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1055 (2017); Pamela Foohey, Access to Consumer Bankruptcy, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341, 360–63
(2018).
290
A small business that files a chapter 7 or other liquidation proceeding, of course, does not emerge from
bankruptcy with a fresh start. But the entrepreneur owner of the small business is nonetheless freed by the speedy
windup of her old business immediately to start a new one—as many choose to do. See Douglas G. Baird &
Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2310–
18, 2328–30 (2005).
291
In re Ward, 546 B.R. 667, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016); see supra notes 243–244 and accompanying
text.
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Limiting the lifespan of the bankruptcy estate moves closer to a model of
light-touch bankruptcy because it reduces the number of interactions between
the debtor and the bankruptcy court. The shadow of the bankruptcy proceeding
is reduced. Although it allows for exceptions, it assumes that once the debtor’s
plan is confirmed and his repayment obligations are crystallized, he will have no
further recourse to the bankruptcy court. As this Article has explained, the debtor
is not required to pay for an attorney to go into court on his behalf to seek
permission to sell assets or make purchases, which the bankruptcy court may
grant based on its view of whether the proposed transactions are financially wise
or involve advantageous terms.292 Even in cases in which the bankruptcy court
approves the proposed transactions, the need for motions practice in such cases
may cost a debtor hundreds of dollars on each occasion.293 This Article proposes
simply to do away with those costs in the post-confirmation world. Nor may the
debtor ordinarily seek the aid of the bankruptcy court in disputes with new
creditors that arise after the financial fresh start of plan confirmation. Although
my view of the limited lifespan of the bankruptcy estate permits exceptions,
presumptively the debtor must deal with those outside bankruptcy on the same
terms as a consumer with no pending bankruptcy case, or a debtor already
granted a chapter 7 discharge.
Light-touch bankruptcy, though, is broader than just the scope of the
bankruptcy estate. Congress and the bankruptcy courts should be attentive to
other ways that debt adjustment bankruptcy may be streamlined for debtors. To
take a number of examples of what light-touch bankruptcy should mean: on an
operational level, debt adjustment bankruptcy should continue the trend towards
use of standardized forms that allow for cheaply prepared, off-the-shelf
reorganization proceedings, and should, where possible, simplify filings that the
debtor makes or receives after the earliest period of the bankruptcy case;
bankruptcy courts should be skeptical of plan provisions, such as conduit
mortgage payment plans, that take control of the debtor’s ordinary financial
affairs away from her;294 and Congress should rigorously scrutinize mandates
292
See In re Ward, 546 B.R. at 680 (declining to approve debtor’s purchase of a car because proposed
financing terms were “onerous and unfavorable” notwithstanding “some anecdotal evidence that [the terms]
might be customary in the industry for individuals in financial distress.”).
293
See id. (describing typical fees in the Northern District of Texas).
294
These are plan provisions or local rules that provide that the debtor’s ongoing monthly mortgage
payment during the plan period is to be paid by the chapter 13 trustee (who may receive the funds, along with
the remainder of the debtor’s plan payments, either via a wage garnishment order or a direct payment from the
debtor), rather than directly by the debtor herself to the mortgage holder.) Although relatively common and
endorsed as a best practice by many bankruptcy judges and professionals, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT OF
THE ABI COMMISSION ON CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 184–87 (2019), one recent study suggested that they have
no statistically significant impact one way or the other on plan completion rates. Greene, Patel & Porter, supra
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such as the requirement in chapter 13 for credit counselling (before a bankruptcy
case is commenced)295 and personal financial management (before a discharge
is granted)296 to ensure these programs provide a sufficient benefit for debtors to
justify the financial and time cost imposed upon debtors.297 One welcome
substantive change would be to amend the Code to change the rules for
modification of confirmed plans in chapters 12 and 13 cases. Under current law,
chapter 12 or 13 debtors may be brought back into bankruptcy court by a motion
of the trustee or a creditor to modify the confirmed plan to increase the debtor’s
payments on the basis that her disposable income has increased in the period
following plan confirmation.298 Subchapter V has eliminated this possibility for
small business debtors, permitting only the debtor to seek modification in order
to reduce its plan payments.299 Adopting that rule in chapters 12 and 13 not only
permits the debtor to benefit from good fortune during the pendency of the case
but also makes the plan period administratively more simple for both the debtor
and trustee.300
Finally, while I do not claim that my model of bankruptcy follows
necessarily from the insights that are at the heart of most recent bankruptcy
scholarship, I note that light-touch bankruptcy is at least consistent with its most
significant conclusions. Light-touch bankruptcy is normatively predicated on the
notion that the substantial majority of debtors do not end up in bankruptcy
because they are bad actors, or because they are unduly or unusually
irresponsible in the management of their finances. Research beginning in the
1980s with the pathbreaking empirical work of Professors Elizabeth Warren, Jay
Westbrook, and Theresa Sullivan has argued instead that bankruptcy is most

note 2, at 1076.
295
11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2019).
296
Id. §§ 111, 727(a)(11), 1328(g)(1).
297
Most debtors do not appear to find these courses helpful. See generally Michael D. Sousa, Just Punch
My Bankruptcy Ticket: A Qualitative Study of Mandatory Debtor Financial Education, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 391
(2013) (“only four out of the fifty-eight participants (6.90%) [] interviewed for this study found the mandated
education courses helpful”); AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ABI COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY 121–25 (2019) (noting widespread criticism of the utility of the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling
requirement and proposing its elimination); id. at 125–26 (describing track record of debtor financial
management course as “mixed at best,” but not proposing repeal).
298
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1229(a)(1), 1329(a)(1).
299
Id. § 1193.
300
Many of my suggestions for a new light-touch framework for debt-adjustment bankruptcy are
consistent in theme with recent reform proposals, such as now-Senator Warren’s bankruptcy reform plan to
replace current chapter 7 and chapter 13 filing rules with a single, streamlined consumer bankruptcy filing
process intended to make bankruptcy “simple, cheap, fast, and flexible.” Fixing our Bankruptcy System to Give
People a Second Chance, ELIZABETH WARREN, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/bankruptcy-reform (last
accessed Nov. 19, 2020).
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frequently the product of unpredictable and frequently unavoidable financial
setbacks, whether income shocks such as job losses or family separation, or
expense shocks, such as medical treatment.301 This research emphasizes that
consumer bankruptcy in the United States frequently plays the role of social
insurance, providing relief for financially distressed debtors that supplements
that provided by more formal social insurance programs such as unemployment
insurance or health insurance.302 Bankruptcy law is not the resort for spendthrifts
seeking to avoid paying too casually incurred debt; rather, it continues to carry
very substantial social stigma, and many consumer debtors will suffer
considerable financial hardship for long periods of time before turning to
bankruptcy to address their problems.303
With this understanding of both of the purposes that bankruptcy law serves
and of the types of debtors that most frequently end up in bankruptcy, a lighttouch model of debt adjustment bankruptcy seems justifiable. Among consumer
bankruptcy’s gravest challenges today are barriers to access that prevent debtors
from gaining effective relief. These are deep-rooted problems that do not admit
of any easy solution. Even if the effect is felt only at the margins, simplifying
and streamlining the bankruptcy process—and thus, potentially, making it
cheaper—may do something to help promote wide access to bankruptcy.
Meanwhile, given the profile of the typical chapter 13 debtor, it is at best
questionable whether the potentially costly additional procedures that I have
described add much value for debtors. There is little reason to believe that close
scrutiny of consumer debtors by the bankruptcy courts is warranted as the price
for admission to bankruptcy—and even less reason to suppose that to be the case
for business debtors under other chapters of the Code.

301
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 6 (Yale University Press 2020).
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CONCLUSION
Since the first years of the modern Code, courts have been divided on the
scope of the post-confirmation estate in chapter 13. A four-way fracture among
courts and commentators has developed, with each theory reflecting radically
different understandings of the structure of chapter 13. As Congress has
expanded the availability of debt adjustment bankruptcy, the dispute over the
fate of the bankruptcy estate has reached beyond chapter 13. Most recently, it
has become of pressing concern to bankruptcy courts who must preside over
new small business cases under subchapter V of chapter 11. As a matter of text,
structure, and purpose, the estate termination theory is the most persuasive of
the various accounts of the lifespan of the bankruptcy estate. The estate
termination theory aligns debt adjustment bankruptcy with traditional chapter 11
and gives full and appropriate effect to the Code’s direction that property of the
estate vest in the debtor upon confirmation of the plan.
Having established that the estate presumptively terminates upon
confirmation of a debt adjustment plan, it is necessary to consider under what
circumstances the plan or confirmation order may deviate from the default rule
and preserve the estate. The power to propose a delay in the revesting of property
of the estate after confirmation belongs to the debtor, rather than to the
bankruptcy court. But it is a limited power. A debtor must be able to point to
some valid bankruptcy law purpose before property can be retained within the
estate. The usual justifications for preserving the estate post-confirmation—in
particular, securing the protection of the automatic stay against postpetition
creditors—do not suffice. Instead, such property must be necessary to the
fulfillment of the plan, the landmark of the post-confirmation world. This
approach appropriately preserves the debtor’s post-confirmation freedom of
action, ensures that postpetition creditors have an avenue to enforce their own
rights outside of the bankruptcy case, and prevents the bankruptcy court from
exercising unlimited jurisdiction over the debtor’s post-confirmation affairs.
Adopting this theory of the estate in debt adjustment bankruptcy cases will help
shift bankruptcy law toward a light-touch approach will minimize the need for
the debtor to interact with the bankruptcy court, and finally, will make the
bankruptcy process as a whole cheaper and less burdensome for debtors.

